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ABSTRACT 
 
SCENARIOS ON THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ROLE IN THE KOSOVO 
QUESTION 
Acar, Başak 
M.A, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Norman Stone 
 
 
October 2008 
 
 
This thesis analyzes the process of European Union’s recent and the 
future role on the Kosovo question. European Union’s involvement in the 
Balkans within the framework of Stability Pact and Stabilization and 
Association Process will be discussed shortly. The thesis will focus on good 
scenarios which are Kosovo’s independence and its membership to European 
Union together with Serbia, and Kosovo’s EU membership while Serbia 
remaining a pariah. The thesis will also concentrate on the nightmare scenarios 
in relation to Kosovo issue are perpetuation of status quo and deterioration of 
status quo. Deterioration of status quo ranges from partition, the risk of 
disruption of territorial integrities of Bosnia, Macedonia, and Serbia. The 
likelihood of greater Kosovo and greater Albania will also be discussed. 
 
Keywords: European Union, Kosovo issue, good scenarios, nightmare 
scenarios                                                 
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ÖZET 
 
AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NİN KOSOVA SORUNUNUN ÇÖZÜMÜNE İLİŞKİN 
ROLÜ ÜZERİNE SENARYOLAR 
Acar, Başak 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Norman Stone 
 
Eylül 2008 
 
 Bu çalışma, Avrupa Birliği’nin Kosova sorununun çözümünde oynayacağı 
rolleri senaryolar yoluyla incelemiştir.  Avrupa Birliği’nin Güneydoğu Avrupa için 
İstikrar Paktı ve Katılım ve İstikrar Süreçleri çerçevesinde bu bölgeyle ilgilenmesi 
üzerinde kısaca durulmuştur. Avrupa Birliği’nin Kosova sorununda şimdiye kadar 
oynadığı rol ekonomik, siyasi boyutlarıyla incelenmiştir. Kosova sorununun 
çözümüyle ilgili senaryolar iyi ve kabus senaryoları olmak üzere ikiye ayrılmıştır. İyi 
senaryolar Kosova’nın bağımsızlığı ve Sırbistan ile birlikte Avrupa Birliği’ne üyeliği 
ve Kosova’nın tek başına Avrupa Birliği üyeliğini kapsamaktadır. Kabus senaryoları 
ise Kosova’nın parçalanmasından, başta Makedonya ve Bosna’nın toprak 
bütünlüklerinin bozulmasına ve Güneydoğu Avrupa’nın istikrarsızlaşmasına, büyük 
Kosova ve geniş Arnavutluk projelerinin gerçekleşmesine kadar farklı alt başlıklardan 
oluşmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Kosova sorunu, iyi senaryolar, kabus senaryoları 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Kosovo continues to be the hot spot in the Balkans, despite the realization of 
conditional independence on February 2008. This development does not only create 
dooms day scenarios in the region and in the world, because of Kosovo being a 
precedent in secessionist claims or frozen conflict zones like Ossetia, Abkhazia, 
Nagorno Karabakh. There is also the good side of the medallion like the continuation 
of freezing the final status of Kosovo was removed from the political scene. This 
generated an atmosphere which encourages foreign direct investment in the country. 
Hence, this could contribute to the decrease in the effect of organized crime in the 
region and unemployment level in Kosovo could be diminished as well. In other 
words, young and unemployed population of Kosovo could no longer be regarded as a 
threat in terms of   having the tendency to take part in the violent actions of KLA. So, 
given the fulfillment of the conditions of independence Kosovo will be a stabilizing 
factor in the region as well. 
 
European Union’s role will be decisive in peaceful settlement of Kosovo dispute. In 
1999 NATO campaign, USA played the military role. But, with the election of 
George W. Bush, 9/11 attacks changed US foreign policy priorities in the Balkans. 
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European Union was responsible in economic reconstruction of Kosovo under 
UNMIK fourth pillar. However, the shift in US foreign policy precedence and the 
proximity of unstable Balkan region in European Union as a threat generated a 
reorientation of European Union’s commitment in the Balkans. European Union 
under the framework of Stability Pact and Stabilization and Association Process 
started to make contractual relations with the Western Balkan countries. The main 
objective of these arrangements is increasing the regional links among the Western 
Balkan1 countries in border management, energy sector, and fight with organized 
crime. European Union offered these states an integration perspective, with the 
reforms in political and economic institutions, creation of a free market economy, 
strong civil society, and fight against corruption. European Union conditionality 
offers carrot and sticks approach for the Western Balkan countries and in order to be a 
part of the European Union these countries started to pursue good neighborly 
relations, increase regional cooperation. If South East European countries had a 
common perspective, that is becoming a member of European Union, then they are 
aware that they must overcome the disputes among them. As a result, European Union 
should continue to apply the integration strategy in the Balkans, however Southeast 
European enlargement can take a long time and it will need financial resources.  
 
Slovenia had been a member state with Central and Eastern European states, Romania 
and Bulgaria were member states since 2007. The next country is Croatia, and it is 
expected that it will be a European Union member in 2009. Macedonia had applied 
for membership, but accession negotiations had not started yet. Albania had signed a 
                                                 
1 Western Balkans and South Eastern European terms will be used interchangeably in the entire text, 
and they cover Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina. The use of 
South Eastern Europe instead of the Balkans is because of the negative connotation of the word. 
Balkans reminds  ethnic conflicts, violence, extreme nationalism, corrupted politicians , continuous 
fragmentation of the states into smaller units and mistreatment of minorities. 
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Stabilization and Association Agreement; Bosnia was in the process of feasibility for 
a Stabilization and Association Agreement. Stabilization and Association Process and 
Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe are in fact complimentary of each other. 
Kosovo crisis in 1999 showed European Union that if European Union wants to be a 
serious actor in world politics, it should be active in the matters in its backyard. After 
NATO’s Kosovo campaign, European Union accelerated their efforts on the 
formation of a European Security and Defense Policy. In this framework, Petersberg 
tasks focus on military crisis management of European Union in humanitarian 
assistance, peacekeeping and peacemaking aspects. Rapid Reaction Force which 
consists of 50000 soldiers will be deployed in two months. In 2003, ESDP operations 
were launched. They were light operations like taking over from previous actions. For 
example, European Union took over the police mission in Bosnia. During the conflict 
among the Albanians and Macedonians in 2001, European Union took over the police 
operation as well.  
 
 Kosovo poses a real challenge to the European Union, in the sense that the efficiency 
of Common Foreign Security Policy will be tested. Each European Union member 
countries had different foreign policy interests, especially in the issue of independence 
of Kosovo. Some member states like Slovakia, Spain, Greece, and Romania had 
already expressed that they would not recognize the independence of Kosovo. Each 
state had its own concern like Spain worries about Kosovo being a precedent for 
Basque. Romania had concerns on Transdienster and instability of Moldova, if 
Transdienster declares independence. Greece and Greek Cypriots worry about the 
recognition of Kosovo’s independence would mean recognition to Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus. Therefore, independence of Kosovo is like opening the box of 
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Pandora for Spain, Romania, Spain, Greece and this would have an impact on 
European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
 
After the toppling of Milosevic, Serbia tried to be integrated into Euro-Atlantic 
structures, and democratic reforms took place. Kostunica was elected as prime 
minister and it is believed to be the right choice. Even though Milosevic had been 
removed from the government, his clients were still in power, criminalization of the 
state and corruption continued. Moreover, Djindic an influential Serbian politician 
was assassinated because of the politician’s stance for prevention of further 
criminalization of the state. Serbian Radical Party inherited the legacy of Milosevic 
and continues to pursue extreme nationalistic aspirations, it is still a powerful element 
in Serbian politics that needs to be taken into consideration. Radical Party did not 
want Kosovo’s independence and still portrays Kosovo as an inseparable part of 
Serbia. In spite of the desire to be a member of European Union, Serbia has not 
fulfilled the condition of delivering war criminals Radko Mladic and Radovan 
Karadzic to International Court of Justice. Serbia does not want to recognize the 
independence of Kosovo. Those are the main obstacles on the way to Brussels. 
Serbian foreign policy objectives are incompatible. Since the independence of Kosovo 
has occurred and the European Union had taken over the mission from United 
Nations, it is no longer possible to reverse the process. So far, Serbia pursued a 
relatively reasonable foreign policy, the military response as an answer to the 
declaration of Kosovo’s independence did not happen. However, parallel structures in 
Serbian populated part of Kosovo, Mitrovica, was a real problem for the new Kosovo 
administration to handle. Furthermore, Prime Minister Kostunica resigned very 
recently for the reason that he finds pro- European Union ministers in his cabinet as 
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selling the national cause that is giving up Kosovo. Stabilization and Association 
Agreement could not be signed firstly due to the failure of the war criminals to Hague 
as already mentioned. The second reason of not signing a SAA with European Union 
is the desire to keep Kosovo. Hence, European Union membership horizon does not 
outweigh the significance of the preservation of Kosovo. 
 
The settlement of Kosovo dispute is directly linked to Kosovo‘s positions, Serbian 
reactions and European Union’s role. The need of scenarios in order to analyze the 
above mentioned factors is obvious. There are two kinds of scenarios: good, stability 
generating ones versus nightmare scenarios on explaining European Union’s future 
role. The good scenarios include Kosovo’s independence and its membership in 
European Union together with Serbia. The other good scenario is Kosovo’s 
independence and membership in European Union while Serbia remaining a pariah. 
Nightmare scenarios on the future role of European Union on Kosovo issues are the 
perpetuation of status quo and the deterioration of the status quo. Thus, projection of 
distinct scenarios is important; also this could contribute to the international relations 
literature. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
SHORT HISTORY OF EUROPEAN UNION ENGAGEMENT IN 
THE BALKANS 
 
 
The pace of the events in the entire European continent change very rapidly. In the 
beginning of 1990’s, with the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern and Central 
Europe, there was an optimist atmosphere. The main perspective was, the end of the 
Cold War is the end of the division between ideological differences, instabilities in the 
form of social, economic and political and ethnic conflicts in the Europe. However, 
the eruption of violence and the bloody fragmentation of Former Yugoslavia formed a 
new environment in the heart of Europe. The head of European Community 
presidency in 1992, Jacques Poos, stated that “this is the hour of Europe”. European 
Community’s failure to put an end in the chaos, violence during the wars of Yugoslav 
dissolution showed that European Community was still not strong, able and willing 
enough to terminate a huge danger that produced instability for the rest of the 
continent. In other words, this means the credibility of European Community was at 
stake, given the failure in its backyard, to what extent it could present itself as a 
formidable actor in world politics. Abramowitz and Hurlburt (2002:  1) indicates that 
“For its own sake, if not for America’s, Europe must succeed there”. Without the 
military assistance of United States during the conflict, and its commitment in the 
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Dayton peace process, European Union would not impose a solution on Bosnia. Given 
the shift in American foreign policy priorities, European Union become the main 
actor in the Balkans which at the same time try to remedy social, political, economic 
problems in the region. Hence, European Union realized that it should form a solid 
European Security and Defense Policy and reinforce the framework of Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. 
 
Another turning point in the history of the engagement of European Union in the 
Balkans in the post Cold War era is the Kosovo crisis of 1997-1998. Once again with 
American leadership, NATO operation took place in 1999. Due to the bad economic 
conditions and fragile political situation in the region, organized crime and influx of 
refugees had been the sources of instability in the Europe’s neighborhood. In addition, 
Serwer (2003: 173) states that “For the EU, the Balkans are the ‘near abroad’ or 
‘Europe’s Mexico’. Instability in the Balkans has repeatedly generated a flow of 
refugees and economic migrants, especially from Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo or Serbia 
in the European Union”. A direct military threat from the Balkans towards European 
Union is not visible, but this does not mean that indirect risks that pose instability 
have been managed. Therefore, decisions of Thessaloniki Summit of 2003 should be 
taken into account.  
 
The main significance of Thessaloniki Summit is: European Union admits its 
commitment in Western Balkans and the future of these countries in the European 
Union if and when they fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. Nevertheless it is noteworthy 
to underline the fact that European Union can and will not give in the fulfillment of 
European standards even for the sake of stability in Western Balkans. Southeastern 
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European countries must be alert about the length of the reform process, the public 
and the politicians should be patient and should not be overwhelmed by the 
seriousness of the task. Another important dynamic in this regard is; if politicians 
change their stance about devotion to be a member of European Union and do not 
control the extreme nationalistic aspirations in the public, and then there is the risk of 
regression in terms of the political reforms like treatment of minorities. As a result of 
this process, irredentism will gain momentum in the region, as well as the ethnic 
turmoil. 
 
Kosovo had demonstrated European Union the necessity of building an active peace 
keeping, conflict prevention missions. In fact, the main framework of this was 
outlined in Petersberg tasks and Cologne Summit. Since then, a rapid reaction force 
consisting of 50,000 soldiers who can be deployed in two months was formed. 
European Union took over from NATO led operations in Macedonia and Bosnia 
Herzegovina, namely operation Concordia and operation Althea. In addition, 
European Union set police missions in the above mentioned countries. Thus, EU is 
active in the post- Ohrid arrangements, course of its implementation. European Union 
sent a new EULEX mission to Kosovo that will take over UNMIK. The central aim of 
this mission is to constitute a functioning legal system that is compatible with 
European standards. European Union does not only need to be involved in military, 
but also it should focus on institution building and for the case of Kosovo state 
building aspects for the Western Balkan countries. Therefore, a new understanding 
and its instruments were set for realizing the objective of bringing Western Balkan 
states closer to the standards of European Union. 
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Enlargement fatigue in European Union, especially after the French rejection of 
European Union constitution is an important factor that needs to be taken into 
consideration while evaluating European Union’s engagement in the Western Balkans 
since Thessaloniki Summit. Western Balkan countries are aware of the fact that they 
must work on the political, economic, and legal reforms. In spite of this, if European 
Union does not reassure Western Balkan countries about membership, then these 
states could lose their dedication in the process of making the essential reforms, or 
keeping nationalistic goals aside. Pond (2005: 34) points out that European Union 
should continue to pursue an integration path to the Western Balkan countries for the 
stability of its neighborhood: 
 
Any happy ending, however, still depends crucially on fulfillment of 
EU’s promise to let the Western Balkans, at the end of the day, join the 
club. If that promise is now rescinded as Europeans become self- 
absorbed in the wake of French referendum, the continent’s remarkable 
democratic transformation may yet exclude the Balkans in Europe’s own 
backyard. 
 
 
Like Pond, Gropas (2008) highlights that “Without the will to accede—on everyone’s 
part—the Western Balkans won’t have the capacity to do so”. Both European Union 
and Western Balkan countries know that EU accession is the only feasible approach 
for overcoming the existing matters. Qerimi indicates that the former communist 
countries want to join to the Western world; they want to have free market economy 
and liberal democracy. These are the  main reasons for the countries quest for EU 
membership. Enlargement of the EU refers  to enlarging the zone of peace, stability, 
freedom (Qerimi, 2002: 47). Stabilization and Association process is useful for 
preparing the region for a sustainable economic, political reforms and a potential 
membership. Institution building in these countries plays a key role. In addition, 
Qerimi depicts that countries in the region are aware of the  fact that they should 
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eliminate the ethnic tensions between them, start to look for the  ways in which they 
can live together peacefully. EU and Southeast European countries should be realistic 
and sincere in their objectives. Qerimi mentions the importance of economic 
prosperity, improvement in the level of communication between the Balkan states for 
building a peaceful, stable region. Extending the zone of stability was and it still is the 
central motto behind EU ’s strategy in the region. Batt (2004: 19) shares Qerimi’s 
ideas about EU enlargement in the Balkans as a stabilizing factor. She has pointed out 
that the precondition of stabilization in the region is EU integration: “This implies that 
the phases of stabilization, transition and integration need to proceed simultaneously 
for their mutually reinforcing effects to work.” Therefore, both EU and the Western 
Balkan countries should find the necessary mechanisms to cope with the matters 
arising from three phases; stabilization, transition and integration. 
 
 Weaver (2005: 165) states that war is a legitimate option in the Balkan context and 
“There is the danger of ethnic conflicts dragging Western powers in on opposing sides 
and thus triggers the return to power politics among the EU core states”. Furthermore, 
EU could not give permission to the hindrances like absorption capacity, enlargement 
fatigue and the challenges of creating a European Union constitution derail EU’s 
engagement in the Western Balkans. Otherwise interethnic confrontations that are 
relatively under control in the Balkan milieu will appear once again most likely in 
Macedonia. For instance, Ragaru (2008: 60) suggests that “If not, the EU might come 
to painfully understand that ‘it’s time has not come’ in the Balkans, nor is it likely to 
do so any time soon”. Likewise Judah (2006: 220) signifies the liability of EU to 
Western Balkans lies in the prospect of membership:  
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With the accession, in 2007 or at the latest 2008, of Romania and 
Bulgaria, the Western Balkans will be completely encircled by EU 
states, but without a credible prospect of eventual membership, the long 
feared “Balkan Ghetto” will have been created and consolidated. 
Another crucial point that is an obstacle not only to the prospective EU 
membership of the Western Balkan countries, but also to the regional 
cooperation is organized crime.  
 
Glenny (2008: 87) has pointed out that the opponents of South Eastern European 
enlargement uses organized crime in the region as a justification to their positions 
without really addressing the political, economic grounds: 
 
For over a decade, south-eastern Europe’s reputation has been tarnished 
by accusations of the region’s alleged accommodation with organized 
crime. These accusations have provided grist to the mill of those arguing 
against the expansion of the European Union into south-eastern Europe. 
Supporters of Balkan accession treat the subject as an irritating 
distraction from the political process of integration. 
 
As I have mentioned before, Kosovo War in 1999 caused a dramatic change in 
European Union’s responsibility in the construction of security, stability in 
Southeastern Europe. O’Brien (2006:75) indicates “the first time that EU 
acknowledged for the Western Balkans had a future in Europe is Sarajevo Summit in 
1999”. Shembilku (2004: 70) makes a differentiation in the EU strategy in the 
enlargement of Southeastern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. The author 
underlines the main difference as whereas the Central Eastern European countries 
enter individually, Southeastern European countries will enter by forming a regional 
cooperation:  
“Functionality” (regional dimension) and “conditionality” (European 
dimension) puts forward two conditional instruments: the creation of a 
regional economic union characterized by close “inter-border” co 
operation and “strengthened” political links in the area of “Common 
Foreign and Security Policy”, and the principle of differentiation- 
“whereby each country must be assessed in terms of its own capacity to 
meet the criteria set for membership. 
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Even though there are counter arguments arising from EU’s reluctance in offering 
prospective membership to Western Balkan countries, the statement of Romano Prodi 
in Greece substantiates the EU’s long term vision for the region is enlargement and 
inclusion. He said: “Whatever its ultimate status, Kosovo must be bound securely into 
the Balkans. And the Balkans must be bound into Europe.” Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe and Stabilization and Association Processes are the core 
instruments in order to materialize the objective of EU in the region. They are 
complementary of each other. Krastev refers to the report of the International 
Commission on the Balkans. The author designates EU faces a dilemma in the form 
of engagement in the Balkans. For him, “the real choice for EU is either enlargement 
or empire.” Krastev also puts an emphasis on “the lack of prospective EU 
membership, the survival of Macedonia as a state can not continue, and Bosnia and 
Kosovo will remain protectorates forever.” Demetropoulou (2002: 104) like Krastev 
identifies the danger of “keeping Balkans outside the functional borders of Europe” as 
producing the risk of new EU approach in the region to fail. Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe, as well as Stabilization and Association Process are important 
tools for European Union. They do not only have a role in institution building, but 
also they are influential in economic and political cooperation among the regional 
states. In the following subsections of this chapter, I will examine Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe, and Stabilization and Association Process separately. 
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2.1. Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 
 
Before the Kosovo crisis, there were regional initiatives; however Kosovo crisis 
showed the ineffectiveness of the existing structures. Joschka Fischer, foreign 
minister of Germany, launched the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Delevic 
(2007: 19) states the main aims of this initiative as: “to contribute to overcoming the 
chronic instability and frequent local conflicts in the Balkans, to foster regional co-
operation and to support the Euro-Atlantic integration of the regional countries.” 
Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, 
Montenegro were the states taking part in the initiative. The composition of Stability 
Pact as follows: Regional Table which consists of other partners like Council of 
Europe, UNHCR, OECD, the World Bank, BSEC, IMF, NATO and the 
representatives of the  member states in the region. Working table has three topics 
focuses on which are democratization and human rights, economic development and 
facilitation of economic cooperation and security matters. Pierre (1999: 2) notes that 
Stability Pact was the first sincere EU attempt to ‘Europeanize’ and ‘de- Balkanize’ 
the Balkans. Kavalski (2003: 202) refers to his ideas directly. Vujetic (2001: 116) 
deepens the argument by stating the incompatibility of the notion of ‘Balkanization’ 
and European integration. 
 
Bendiek (2004: 2) exhibited a similar explanation of the goal of the Stability Pact 
when she said “The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is the first long-term 
structural conflict prevention policy initiated by the EU.”  Since EU could not manage 
to prevent escalation of conflict neither in Bosnia, nor in Kosovo, in this sense a shift 
in the nature of EU engagement for South East Europe was necessary. ‘Peace by 
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integration’ becomes the central strategy of European Union in this regard. If EU had 
not changed the nature of its engagement in the region, then there would be a vicious 
cycle of further ethnic, social, economic conflicts, due to noncompliance with 
minority rights, lack of democracy, rule of law, discriminatory treatment, and absence 
of economic reforms for a liberal economy. On the basis of this argument, it can be 
inferred that overcoming the nature of ethnic, social, political issues in the Balkans is 
directly linked to “EU’s commitment on extension of European zone of stability, 
prosperity.”(Bendiek, 2004: 20) Like Bendiek, Simic (2001: 29) points out the sine 
qua non quality of EU perspective for the Balkans “ For European forces in Balkan 
states, membership of the Union is practically the only way to get anchored in 
Western values and to stabilize their societies and their international environment in 
the transition process.” 
 
By offering prospective EU membership, EU utilizes its carrot and stick approach. In 
other words, EU reinforces conditionality without giving in the fulfillment of 
Copenhagen criteria. Simic (2001: 29) also lists “devotion to conditionality” and 
“disproportionate allocation of EU’s financial assistance to Central and Eastern 
European countries” as the factors that disrupted the balance in the expense of the 
South Eastern European countries. Moreover, CEE countries had been successful at 
institution building, coping with economic difficulties; the transition period to market 
economy was managed well. Also, the chance of escalation of ethnic conflict was 
minimized due to the EU membership perspective. But this was not the case for South 
Eastern European states. Given the lack of prospective EU membership, in particular, 
transition problems from communist legacy such as; criminalization of the state, non-
transparency, unaccountable politicians, discriminatory treatment to minorities, and 
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extreme nationalism nourished atmosphere for inter ethnic violence. Thus, Stability 
Pact is the central instrument for helping the Balkans to catch the last train to 
democracy, prosperity, peace and stability. 
 
In fact, magnetic attraction of integration to Euro- Atlantic structures is the key for 
Western Balkan states. Those states induce the solution of their economic, political, 
social problems to the integration of EU, NATO. While this motive could be a 
catalyst in terms of achieving the goal of membership, it may have destructing effects 
at the same time. As long as the reforms had been internalized by the society, there is 
no problem. On the other hand, just for the sake of doing reforms fast, having cursory 
reforms would not be the panacea for Western Balkan states. Furthermore, those 
superficial reforms would derail the countries from their purpose. For instance, 
superficial reforms can make both politicians and the public convinced of the 
sufficiency of the reforms, when EU said the opposite; this will create dissatisfaction 
among the elite and the public. Biermann (unknown date: 19) reveals a similar kind of 
approach when he said  “Having raised high expectations among the peoples of South 
Eastern Europe, growing disillusionment seems to be inevitable as the years go by and 
the promise of eventual    membership does not materialize.” 
 
Another sector of the political reforms in Western Balkans is the one regarding the 
civilian control of military. EU’s insistence in this respect lies in the understanding of 
democratic process of accountability; transparency could facilitate the reduction of 
military expenditure. As a consequence, the public can question the cost of resolving 
a dispute with a neighbor country in military means and choose the peaceful methods 
of resolving dispute. Vujetic (2001: 114) indicates Stability Pact as “a process of that 
 16
promotes social learning, trust building”. Therefore, within the framework of Stability 
Pact for South Eastern Europe, reconciliation and formation of good neighborly 
relations, and regional cooperation could be realized.  
 
Stability Pact contributed to the economic assistance that is needed by Western 
Balkan states. Donor support is crucial in the sense of upgrading the infrastructure. 
Given the setting up of the infrastructure, there will be an increase in the level of 
foreign direct investment. Moreover, trade agreements especially in energy, tourism 
can smooth the progress of regional co-operation. So, historical rivalries, extreme 
nationalist tendencies and high degree of distrust can no longer poison the regional 
cooperation in economic aspect specifically.  
 
Türkeş and Gökgöz (2006:  679-680) underline the major deficit of Stability Pact as 
rewarding the ones which are more successful at fulfilling the European standards in 
terms of institution building, and cutting the amount of financial assistance for the 
deprived ones. Second, Stability Pact is not powerful and independent enough in 
economic terms, so it can not supply the essential financial resources. In addition to 
the failures mentioned above, Biermann (unknown date: 49) puts an emphasis on the 
three areas  Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia as crisis generating ones, which 
have the potential to reverse the improvements that took place recently. For instance, 
the crisis in Macedonia demonstrated the ineffectiveness of Stability Pact on the 
diplomatic and economic aspects in terms of keeping the region secure and stable. 
Vujetic (2001: 128) raises the proposition of the potential of Stability Pact becoming 
“transnational instrument for stabilization, cooperation and integration.” Regional 
integration and cooperation can be useful for EU integration. On the other hand, there 
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is the possibility of a shift in the engagement of EU in the Balkans. By this I mean the 
regional integration for the South Eastern European states should not replace the 
existing dynamics for an eventual EU membership perspective. Because there would 
be a huge disappointment in the South Eastern European countries, despite their 
commitment in the reform process to meet European values. 
 
The final point that needs to be stressed in this subsection is the relation between 
Stability Pact and Kosovo. I have already pointed out the reason of creating a body 
like Stability Pact was the problem of Kosovo. Serbia was a member of the initiative 
from the beginning. But due to the international administration in Kosovo and its 
unclear final status at that time, there was a special relation among Kosovo and 
Stability Pact that is in accordance with the decision of UN 1244. Stability Pact via 
European Bank of Reconstruction had helped financially and technically especially in 
the areas of institution, capacity building in Kosovo. Bearing in mind Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence and the dangers of escalation of conflict in the region, the 
necessity of increase in the role of Stability Pact is obvious. As Stability Pact is a 
regional cooperation body designed for a conflict prevention tool by the EU, it must 
be influential as a platform where discussing the Kosovo issue can occur. Following 
the take over of EU mission from UNMIK, Stability Pact will be involved more in 
Kosovo. It will not be a surprise if Kosovo and Stability Pact begin to reorganize the 
nature of relationship among them. Therefore, under these conditions Kosovo could 
be the next member of the initiative which is considered as a stepping stone to EU. 
 
To recall what I have emphasized previously, Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 
and Stabilization and Association Process are the complementary strategies of EU’s 
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Balkan engagement. As I have dealt with the first one in this subsection, in the next 
subsection I will deal with the Stabilization and Association Process. 
 
 
 
2.2. Stabilization and Association Process 
 
 
Like Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Stabilization and Association process 
was set up in 1999. Stabilisation and Association Process,a new contractual 
relationship, consists of two stages: utilisation of crisis management tools in the 
region is done under stabilisation agenda. Cameron (2006: 102) defines Association 
as: “integrating the Western Balkan countries gradually into European structures.” 
Step by step implemetation has distinct phases like feasibility studies of SAA, the 
beginning, conclusion and ratification of SAA. The countries which are part of this 
process is Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Kosovo. Croatia is the closest  one to  EU membership, as it had candidate status, had 
already started accession negoiation; so it is very likely that Croatia will join in EU in 
three years. Macedonia had a candidate status too, but accession negoiations with EU 
could not start very soon. Albania signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA) in 2007, Montenegro had initial- led the agreement. Kosovo was included in 
the process with a tracking mechanism before the declaration of independence. It is 
expected that after some time and improvement, it will have the same status like the 
other states. Bosnia had feasibility studies for signing a SAA.  
 
In spite of the inclusive dimension of Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), 
Serbia, up to now, failed to start SAA due to its non-compliance with the decisions of 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Failure of 
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compliance in the delivering war criminals Radko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic 
obstructed the road of Serbia towards EU integration. Even though EU had been very 
helpful during the SAA negoiations, every endeavor is doomed not to thrive due to 
non-compliance with ICTY. Final status of Kosovo, that is independence will not be 
agreed by Serbia, is another obstacle on signing SAA. From Serbian perspective, EU 
uses SAA as leverage to push Serbia accept the independence of Kosovo. Thus, 
Serbia is at the crossroads in this respect; it wants to be a part of EU, at the same time 
it is not ready to pay the price, which is the acceptance of Kosovo’s independence. 
 
Delevic (2007: 25) states the main aim of SAP as “to help the region secure political 
and economic stabilization while also developing closer association with the EU.” 
SAP will provide financial support for institution building, making trade reforms for a 
liberal economy that can compete in EU market and facilitate intra-regional trade, 
developing required   infrastructure such as construction of the roads. SAP falls under 
EU policy of reinforcing regional cooperation. The Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 
showed that the commitment of EU does not change, which is: ‘the future of Western 
Balkans is within the EU”. Thessaloniki Summit also clarifies the conditions for 
further integration with EU; which are implementation of the reforms, meeting 
Copenhagen criteria. Each country’s performance on these aspects will be judged on 
an individual basis. According to the Commission report of EU that is issued in 
27.01.2006, “SAP will remain the framework for the European course of countries in 
the Western Balkans throughout the enlargement process.” This report also notes the 
unsatisfactory developments about regional trade integration especially about the 
level of intraregional trade that is not close to realize its full potential. In order to 
consolidate the democratization process in the Western Balkans, EU Commission 
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Report highlights the significance of existence of an independent media and a strong 
civil society. SAP framework also encourages regional cooperation in education, 
energy, culture. Political dialogue, combating organized crime, and also border 
management are among the other areas that SAP framework enforces regional 
cooperation. CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratization 
and Stabilization) provides the financial assistance for the construction of 
infrastructure, capacity and institution building, civil society formation, maintenance 
of minority rights, refugee return. 
 
Lefne (2004: 122) asserts the example of Croatia and Macedonia which are the states 
that has applied for EU membership prior to the entry into force of their Stabilization 
and Association Agreements. For him, the other Western Balkan countries are more 
likely to imitate this way. Pre-accession status can grant more financial assistance 
than SAP; so this is more beneficial for the Western Balkan states. Croatia was a 
promising country in terms of both fulfillment of SAP conditionality, and making, 
implementation of the reforms. However, Croatia enjoys a position as a strong nation 
state as well as transformation of the HDZ policies in accordance with EU reforms. 
Therefore, while evaluating Croatia’s successful performance, these dynamics should 
be taken into consideration. Unfortunately, not all the states in the region are as lucky 
as Croatia in terms of being fragile owing to either unresolved status issues or the 
minority issues. O’Brien (2006: 76) indicates the shift in the EU engagement in the 
Balkans has a positive impact on bringing the Western Balkan countries closer to EU. 
The author makes an emphasis on “the modification of EU treatment of its 
membership process as an answer to security problems” is a more conducive approach 
than obstruction of EU membership due to ongoing security issues. Biermann 
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(unknown date, 22) classifies the position of European bureaucracies as the ones for 
EU accession of South East European countries and skeptics of this. For the skeptics, 
“the new EU approach might have been designed to buy time until Kosovo crisis is 
over.” This claim had been falsified given the continuing devotion of EU in the 
Western Balkans via Stabilization and Association Process. Hard security issues 
remained aside since NATO’s Kosovo operation, however, soft security issues such 
as failing states, unresolved status issues, fragile economies are not very trouble-free 
ones to cope with. Finally, soft security issues bare the risk of changing into hard 
security ones.2 If EU can give a reliable assurance for the security of South Eastern 
European countries, combined with a durable economic stability perspective, then the 
zone of peace, stability, prosperity will be enlarged. The Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe, and Stabilization and Association Process are the main channels of 
accomplishing this goal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 For instance, Macedonia is a fragile state arising from its vulnerability in relation to demands of 
highly populated Albanian minority. Despite the EU brokered Ohrid Agreement, Albanian minority 
may want further reforms in terms of equality and the riots may start again. It is known that there has 
already been resentment among Macedonians, since the new framework agreement grants so many 
favorable conditions to Albanian minority in ethnic Macedonian perspective. Besides, there are 
economic problems in the state. Finally, Kosovo’s status issue poses a formidable threat to Macedonian 
territorial integrity since Macedonian Albanians may want to unite with an independent Kosovo. Given 
the violent events in 2001 in Macedonia, almost a civil war erupted; there have already been the 
presence of KLA in Macedonia in the border zone. EU had taken over the police mission from NATO. 
Within Ohrid Framework, pockets of KLA left Macedonia, arms was delivered to state. Therefore, 
active engagement of EU had a positive impact on the peaceful resolution of the crisis. EU gave 
candidate status to Macedonia for supporting the reform process in the country. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
EUROPEAN UNION’S RECENT ROLE IN KOSOVO 
 
 
As peaceful resolution of Kosovo issue stands as an obstacle both in the regional 
cooperation and in the path to European integration. Tools of EU engagement in the 
Western Balkans like Stability Pact and Stabilization and Association Process can not 
realize their full potential that is extending the European zone of prosperity, peace and 
stability towards Western Balkans. Economic cooperation in the region is vulnerable 
because of the disruption of organized crime, criminalization of the state, and lack of 
institutions and infrastructure. Despite the fact that EU offered CARDS, and other 
financial assistance to Western Balkan countries including Kosovo these states still 
fall under the category that I described. These states have fragile economies, 
organized crime as it is like a regional epidemic. Glenny (2008: 101) underlines the 
Yugoslav embargo’s effect on the creation of a ‘pan-Balkan mafia’. The author also 
mentions the course of Kosovo and Macedonian wars was influential as smuggling 
routes. Milosevic’s defeat in Kosovo war, caused his topplement, so Serbian mafia is 
looking for his replacement for the continuation of criminalization in the state. 
Simultaneously, pockets of Kosovo Liberation Army use Kosovo as a distribution 
centre of drugs, as well as small arms, human trafficking. These illegal activities 
manage to flourish in an unstable atmosphere due to the Kosovo’s future.  
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Before the source of instability was the undetermined final status, now it is not the 
status issue anymore. Danger arises because of the spill over effect of Kosovo’s 
independence. For Serbia this is unacceptable. Kosovo’s loss can not be tolerated 
without compensation. Territorial integrity of Macedonia, Bosnia is at stake. In other 
words, Kosovo issue constrains the means of EU engagement in the Western Balkans 
as I have stated previously. For instance, Kosovo constitutes the main part of the 
disagreement between EU and Serbia. Failure to finalize SAA is due to the Serbia’s 
insistence on not giving up Kosovo. Kostunica opposed signing of SAA given that 
EU uses this as leverage. Kostunica called for early elections, on the basis of the 
argument: Pro-EU ministers in the government do not react in accordance with 
Serbia’s national interests, they undermine Serbia’s future. Therefore, given the EU’s 
effective role in Kosovo’s independence, Serbia perceives EU efforts for its 
stabilization as ambivalent moves. This chapter will focus on distinct aspects of EU’s 
recent role in Kosovo. The first subsection of this chapter EU’s role under UNMIK 
fourth pillar deals with EU’s economic role in the state. It will be followed by role 
that EU plays in the discussions of standards and status. SAP Tracking Mechanism 
falls under this subsection. The last subsection of this chapter provides information 
the new EU mission which is called as EULEX (European Union Legislation and 
Execution Mission) 
 
 
 24
3.1. European Union’s Role in Economic Development and Reconstruction 
 
European Union’s role was designed in accordance with United Nations Security 
Council resolution 1244. 3 EU’s main function in Kosovo was under United Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK) fourth pillar namely: Economic Development and 
Reconstruction. Economic problems have been widespread in Kosovo since in the 
beginning of 1990’s; and Milosevic’s policy of ethnic cleansing in the area disrupted 
the infrastructure. Besides, given the NATO’s Kosovo campaign railroads, 
telecommunication systems have been damaged considerably. When EU entered in 
the field of economic development and reconstruction, what was left in Kosovo can 
be summarized in a single word: Ruin. EU have become the largest donor who 
provided” over 1 billion € up to 2005 via the long-term development programs by the 
European Agency for Reconstruction since 1999.”(Communication from the EU 
Commission, A European Future for Kosovo, 2005, 3) 
 
European Union is in charge of Economic Development and Reconstruction in 
Kosovo under UNMIK fourth pillar since NATO’s Kosovo campaign. Besides, for 
the stabilization of the country EU had a task force. Primary aspect of EU’s role in 
Kosovo is contribution to the process of building necessary institutions such as 
judiciary mechanisms, rule of law. Absence of infrastructure like telecommunication 
system, railroads, and a proper banking sector is assisted via EU channels such as 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. The level of unemployment is 
                                                 
3 For further information about UNMIK, see Yannis, “Kosovo under International Administration: An 
Unfinished Conflict”. Yannis refers to the composition of  United Nations Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK 
under UN Resolution 1244. There are four pillars run by foour different international organisations 
which form UNMIK. The first of these pillars is Humanitarian Assistance led by UNHCR, the Second 
one is the Civil Administration run by UN. OSCE was in charge of Democratisation and Institution 
Building, EU is in charge of the last pillar, which is responsible for Economic Development and 
Reconstruction. 
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high, wages are low. World Bank estimates range from 23 to 33 percent. As a 
consequence, standard of living is quite problematic. Due to the high rate of 
unemployment among young population, there is the risk of youth’s involvement in 
organized crime as a way of achieving good life. Despite the fact that public sector is 
too limited too fiscally to drive the economy forward, public sector is yet the main 
source of employment (Economic Strategy and Project Identification Group Policy 
Paper No.1, 2004: 12). The contribution of EU in the field of economic development 
and reconstruction is crucial, since a viable economy for Kosovo can only be formed 
in this way. Economic development is a prerequisite to political stability as well.  
 
Sejdiu (2005: 71) refers to a Rand Institute Report issued in 2003 while he states “the 
rapid GDP per capita recovery, a very quick renewal of the private economic sector.” 
Like Sejdiu, Altmann (2004: 83) indicates the main reasons of a rise in the growth 
rate are the remittances from the Kosovar Diaspora just after 1999 operation, and the 
higher international assistance. Abramowitz and Hurlburt (2002: 4) argue that the 
reduction in CARDS would “hit Kosovo particularly hard”. Even though the final 
status of Kosovo is no longer undetermined, there is still the possibility of a violent 
conflict. Therefore, the business climate is not suitable for attracting foreign direct 
investment. Privatization has been hindered given the unresolved property matters, 
especially Serbian claims on public property. The main EU instrument of donor 
assistance in Kosovo is CARDS. CARDS will be utilized to stabilize democracy 
including refugee return, civil society; to maintain good governance and institution 
building judicial system; to foster economic and social development such as trade, 
infrastructure, and education. After a reduction in EU’s financial assistance, from 
2007 onwards will rise again and change its form. Instrument of Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA) will be beneficial for Kosovo in the sense of ‘Institution Building 
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and Transition Support’ and ‘Cross-Border Cooperation’. 200 million € is granted by 
the European Commission from 2007 to 2009. 
 
EU under UNMIK fourth pillar tries to modernize Kosovo’s economy on the basis of 
European standards. Also, in order to achieve this aim, it helps Kosovo to have 
economic agreements with neighboring states. These agreements are diverse in terms 
of the fields from energy, transportation, tourism and trade liberalization. Free Trade 
Agreements are signed with Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia. These bilateral 
free trade agreements united in new regional economic cooperation framework called 
as CEFTA. CEFTA will bring a move to Kosovo’s exporters; also this will contribute 
to further economic development of the state. Delevic (2007: 59) states that “trade 
liberalization and economic integration are a must. This will hold even more true once 
it ceases being dependent on aid and transfers.” Energy sector is promising given the 
rich mineral sources in Kosovo. Regional integration in this field and taking part in 
the institutions in accordance with EU acquis communautaire 4will be decisive for 
Kosovo, while attracting foreign direct investment for the reconstruction of the plants, 
infrastructure for the advancement of Kosovo’s energy sector. 
 
International assistance should be used directly for the economic development, 
institution and capacity building, democratization. Without achieving European 
standards in these fields, if the financial assistance is not utilized in the way it should 
be, then there is the danger of economic and fiscal problems to take root. Besides, 
foreign direct investment could not be obtained and organized crime can be more 
influential in Kosovo’s economy. Hence, the more steps taken towards EU integration 
by meeting European standards, the more Kosovo could escape from the trap of 
                                                 
4 Acquis communautaire is the entire body of  European Union legislation. 
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transition, coping with the economic, political challenges arising from the in-
dependence. This fact should also be taken into account; Kosovo could not afford a 
strong military that needs a considerable part of the state budget.  
 
 
3.2. European Union’s Role in Kosovo’s Meeting the Standards and Kosovo’s 
Status Discussions, and Special SAP Tracking Mechanism for Kosovo 
 
Following NATO’s Kosovo campaign, G-8 concluded a peace agreement. With UN 
Security Council’s mandate, 1244 Resolution constitutes international military 
presence KFOR led by NATO. Final status discussions have been postponed for a 
while, 1244 Resolution states that Kosovo will be remained as a part of Serbia with 
substantial autonomy. There are four types of solutions with respect to Kosovo’s final 
status. I will give brief information about them 1. Standards before status: In the 
initial stage, this was the main strategy of the international community. Before 
addressing a final political and legal settlement of Kosovo, political and economic 
reforms in the direction of European standards should be accomplished. However, this 
strategy did not succeed, because of the Kosovar Albanian demands of independence, 
and the problems of unresolved status for the security, stability of the Balkans. 2. 
Standards and Status: This was the new slogan among the Kosovar Albanian 
politicians. Given the 90% of the population wanted immediate independence, to what 
extent international community can be successful at postponing the final status 
discussions? Both politicians and the public in Kosovo want independence and being 
a member of European Union. Thus, they are ready for meeting the European 
standards. 3. More than autonomy less than independence: This was and still is the 
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Serbian position in Kosovo issue. Independence of Kosovo is not an acceptable option 
for the Serbs, as Kosovo is the cradle of Serbian civilization, not only as a historical 
myth, but also as the religious centre, the old monasteries are significant for the 
Serbian identity. 4. Conditional independence: On the basis of a road map, Kosovo 
will be independent in accordance with Ahtisaari’s proposal. I will deal with the 
Standards for Kosovo, later I will refer to the content of Ahtisaari’s proposal. 
Standards for Kosovo are designed by UNMIK, “to make Kosovo a place where all 
people regardless of ethnic, racial or religious differences can live, work, and travel in 
peace, tolerance and justice.” The main conditions for independence can be 
summarized as follows: Change of borders is not allowed. In other words, unification 
with another country is not acceptable. In this sense, Macedonia’s fragile territorial 
integrity is no longer at stake theoretically; also the notion of Greater Albania can not 
be materialized, so the Serbian and Greek fears of Greater Albania project will be 
prevented. Respect for human rights is an important condition, which ensures the non 
discriminatory treatment to minorities in the areas of judiciary, police, and 
administration. Serbian monasteries as a part of cultural heritage must be protected. 
Final condition is the rejection of use of force in the settlement of internal and 
external disputes in a regional context.  
 
Standards for Kosovo are introduced due to remove the developmental gap among 
Kosovo and EU. Copenhagen criteria can be met, if these standards bolster 
coexistence among various ethnic groups. Moreover, these standards are also 
instrumental in the process of Kosovo’s prospective EU membership. A multi ethnic 
society in Kosovo with democracy, tolerance and rule of law is the main objective of 
EU in the Balkans for the prevention of a violent conflict. There are eight categories 
 29
of standards. 1. Functioning democratic institutions covers the existence of free, 
transparent elections where internally-displaced persons included in voting, parallel 
structures was dismantled and decentralization come true, media and civil society 
should be independent, and should not function on the basis of ethnic discrimination. 
2. Rule of law: An impartial, non-discriminatory police, and judicial system in 
accordance with European values which fully respects human rights is essential. 
Crimes of ethnic hatred and finance like money laundering, organized crime should 
not be tolerated. 3. Freedom of movement: The people in Kosovo can access and 
utilize public facilities, travel, and work freely without intimidation of being harassed 
or attacked on the basis of discrimination. Free use of language in the related fields 
should be established and preserved. Issue of personal document in one’s native 
language, meetings of the Assembly and committees conducted in all official 
languages are embracing improvements towards minorities. 4. Sustainable Returns 
and the Rights of Communities and their members: This standard requires the 
return of refugees and displaced persons with safety, and without discriminatory 
treatment. Protection of human rights should be enforced on the basis of European 
standards. 5. Economy: Tax systems, privatization, and institutions that are necessary 
for a market economy should be set up. 6. Property Rights: For the return of 
refugees and displaced persons a new legislation is essential. Kosovo’s cultural 
heritage should be protected and respected as well. 7. Dialogue: Constructive stance 
is necessary, use of force while resolution of either external or an internal dispute is 
not an acceptable method. 8. Formation of the Kosovo Protection Corps: When a 
sudden attack occurs in humanitarian or emergency sense, this organization will be 
helpful. 
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In line with these standards for Kosovo, Council of European Union’s Legislative 
Acts that is issued in January 2006 rejuvenates EU’s commitment to multi ethnic 
society, elimination of discriminatory treatment towards minorities. Facilitation of the 
climate for the return of the minorities and their inclusion in the political process of 
the country, particularly the Serbian minority, is extremely crucial. This will not only 
be beneficial at the process of maintaining constructive dialogue with Belgrade and 
the realization of EU criteria for future membership, but also will contribute to the 
Kosovo government’s  handling the issue of Serbian minority’s setting up parallel 
structures. EU supports financially the decentralization process in Kosovo. Besides, 
from EU perspective, decentralization can provide the integration of Serbian minority 
to Kosovo state, and prevent the necessity of the parallel structures with Belgrade. 
The EU Council’s Legislative Act makes an emphasis on good neighborly ties, 
peaceful resolution of conflicts and regional cooperation (Council of the European 
Union, Legislative Acts, January 2006: 6, 34, 35, 39, 40).  
 
Finnish diplomat, UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Marti Ahtisaari prepared 
the main steps of conditional independence of Kosovo. As I have mentioned 
previously, 90% of the Kosovo population demand outright independence and can 
resort to violence as in the case of Mitrovica, because of the unsustainable status quo. 
EU, US realized the danger of freezing the determination of Kosovo status can be 
more destabilizing for the security, stability in the Balkans. Judah (2006: 215) states 
that “the talks are not about the status of Kosovo, but about negotiating the status of 
the Serbs in Kosovo.” Thus, conditional independence is the best solution in the 
context of providing the continuation of a secure, stable atmosphere in the region.  
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International Criminal Group Report (185, 2007: 2) indicates the presence of EU and 
its taking the main responsibility on conditional independence of Kosovo: 
 
The Ahtisaari Plan foresees it sending a special representative with a 
large staff to coordinate civilian supervision of conditional independence 
and a rule of law mission, as well as providing through its membership 
candidacy processes the economic support, and motivation that can 
ensure an independent Kosovo does not become a failed state.  
 
International Crisis Group Report 185 recommends to EU and its members that they 
must be aware of the fact that if a unified EU policy on the support of conditional 
independence is not materialized, then CFSP and ESDP will be ineffective. In 
addition, EU member states should notice that the best solution for the peaceful 
resolution of Kosovo issue is the conditional independence, recognition of Kosovo is 
an important step with respect to the implementation of Ahtisaari plan. This Plan 
designates postponement of the formation of a Kosovar army since KFOR will stay to 
protect Kosovo’s borders, and guarantee Serbian minority’s security. EU should make 
Serbia realize the progress of Serbia in the Stabilization and Process is directly linked 
to its positive role on the Kosovo issue (International Crisis Group Report 185, 
August 2007:  3). “What was new and what made the Ahtisaari Plan potentially 
attractive for Prishtina and Belgrade was the Europeanization of the international 
presence and the back door for de facto secession respectively” van Meurs Part 9, 
2008: 16). However, both Kosovo and Serbia rejected partition as a way of solution 
and claimed their sovereignties on the whole of Kosovo. Therefore, EU members will 
form a common position via the principle of constructive abstention for the members 
that are skeptical of Kosovo’s independence, in order not to undermine the stability of 
the Western Balkans and not to weaken the credibility of CFSP. 
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Cohen (2006: 8) signifies distinct positions of EU member states within the context of 
Kosovo. Some member states perceive partition of the state as a solution to the 
Kosovo issue, but given the conditions for Kosovo’s independence, no change 
concerning the border of Kosovo will take place. As a consequence, partition as an 
alternative is no longer suitable as a solution. Greece, Spain, Romania, Cyprus are 
against full-fledged independence of Kosovo. Cyprus thinks Kosovo will be a 
precedent for the recognition of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Greece shares 
the same anxiety; however it also has other reasons such as the risk of the Albanian 
refugee problem due to the possibility of Kosovo being a failed state. Spain fears that 
Kosovo will be a precedent for Basque’s separatist claims. Except Cyprus, all other 
states had joined the bandwagon in some way, though some of the above mentioned 
states still have not recognized Kosovo as an independent state. Cohen (2006: 8) 
underlines the fact that as soon as the implications of failed EU constitution and EU 
enlargement will be removed from discussion, “the potential political implications 
and financial burden of long-term management over Kosovo’s affairs” will be 
questioned as well. 
 
EU’s role on the basis of Ahtisaari plan has a significant dimension which is 
Kosovo’s integration to EU as a member that should be taken into account. In 
advance of Ahtisaari Plan, EU had a special SAP Tracking Mechanism with Kosovo 
was confirmed in the Thessaloniki Summit. This mechanism offers Kosovo to 
improve at its own speed, and formed under European Partnership in November 2005 
with Serbia and Montenegro, including Kosovo. Kosovo initiated European 
Partnership Action Plan, which guides Kosovo’s reforms compatible with 
Copenhagen criteria. For a full fledged Stabilization and Association Agreement, EU 
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must establish contractual relations with the state. Since in 2005 Kosovo was not an 
independent state, STM was offered. It is highly likely that full fledged Stabilization 
and Association Agreement will be conducted with Kosovo. Both EU and Kosovo’s 
commitment to this process should stay alive; in this sense monitoring of EU for 
further progress with reference to implementation is essential. For instance, during the 
second meeting of the Kosovo SAP Tracking Mechanism in 2003, it is recommended 
that minority participation in the administration and multi ethnic composition of 
police, judiciary should be reinforced. Furthermore, both the first and the second 
meetings of SAP Tracking Mechanism highlight “school text-books should be 
screened on their factual accuracy and be brought in line with Council of Europe 
standards.”(First and Second Meeting of the Kosovo SAP Tracking Mechanism, 
March-July 2003: 1) All of these suggestions are in accordance with the Standards for 
Kosovo and makes Kosovo more close to EU integration. An additional improvement 
is in the quality of Kosovo’s media which has diminished the hate speech and biased 
reporting, also crimes with ethnic motivation is in decline. In spite of these 
developments, minorities of Roma and Serbian particularly face discrimination in the 
access to public utilities, education and limitations  in the freedom of movement due 
to lack of security grants continue. (Commission of the European Communities, 
Kosovo Under UNSCR 1244 2006 Progress Report, 2006: 14) 
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3.3. European Union Legislation and Execution Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) 
 
Maliqi (1998: 75) emphasizes the necessity of EU engagement in Kosovo, in some 
ways he foresees the groundings of EU strategy in the province, for him EU is the key 
to stop further instability, violence: 
 In the case of Kosovo, there is no way in which EU can appear neutral, 
or still be an innocent bystander. On the contrary, Europe holds the keys 
to Kosovo’s destiny, in that it still maintains the right to determine 
questions of sovereignty, and decides who are fully capable of forming a 
state, and who not. Because Europe today, as before, considers the 
Balkans to be a “domestic issue”, and part of its back yard, or even an 
annex to its own home, the EU considers it natural to assume the role of 
main arbiter in the current, very tragic Balkan crisis. 
 
Like Maliqi, Delevic highlights the importance of EU in the resolution of Kosovo 
issue. Delevic (2007: 82) states that EU will take over from UNMIK, “undertake a 
huge political and diplomatic investment, but will also, if things go wrong, have to 
deal with consequences in its immediate neighborhood.” Cohen (2006: 6) indicates 
the warnings in Eide, who is the UN mission representative of Kosovo, had prepared a 
report in 2005. Eide Report talks about inter ethnic reconciliation can not be achieved 
in the near future. In order to achieve this aim, EU might have a potential role. 
According to decision of the European Council in 14 December 2007, EU declared 
that it is ready to send a mission to substitute UN. However, this does not mean that 
all EU member states will recognize an independent Kosovo. For instance, Spain 
declared that it will not recognize Kosovo’s independence, but at the same time works 
for the institution building of Kosovo. This situation can be understood in the context 
of European consensus. Javier Solana prepared a mission that has civil administrative, 
judicial and police teams. Pond (Atlantic Community Workshop “Kosovo: It’s Not as 
Bad as You Think”, 2007) explains the conditions for EU take over. Following the 
declaration of independence, Kosovo parliament would send an invitation to EU. 
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Reinterpretation of UNSCR 1244 in line with the idea that “since 1244 does not 
stipulate that Serbia holds sovereignty until the Security Council decrees some new 
status, a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status” will be the solution 
that EU looks for. Pond signifies the ongoing EU mission take over as a part of the 
political process and the recognition of Kosovo’s conditional independence by several 
states as the determination of Kosovo’s future status. (2007: 4). There are conflicting 
views for this topic as well. For example, Tziampiris (2005: 292) points out the 
limited role in the final status discussions for Kosovo:  
This is because Kosovo’s final status has to be decided by the UN Security 
Council and not by other international organizations, regardless of how 
well-intentioned or well-funded their aims may be. In other words, the 
EU’s role in Kosovo can be of substance only post-1244. 
 
There are four types of challenges for EU with respect to its new position in Kosovo. 
First of all, relations between EU and Russia will be tense. As EU take over in 
Kosovo is not on the basis of a UNSC resolution, and Russia was not included in the 
decision making process and it was totally against any kind of independence to 
Kosovo, Russia will be less conducive to help EU. Secondly, preservation of unity 
among EU members about the new mission is of vital importance. Furthermore, EU 
must be aware of the fact that it will give a considerable amount of financial, technical 
and diplomatic assistance. If there is a split occurs about the nature of the EU mission 
in Kosovo, then the credibility of EU is at stake among Kosovar politicians and 
public. Hence, without the credibility in the eyes of Kosovo leadership and public, to 
what extent can one expect EU perform its role as a checks and balancer, which is the 
supervisor of the supervised independence. Thirdly, Schmidt (2008: 28) describes 
Serbian and other minorities’ assurance for their stay, and minority protection in 
accordance with Ahtisaari plan as another problem that EU needs to tackle. The final 
point is the expected tension in EU-Serbia relations. Up to now, Serbia has not given 
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up the notion that Kosovo is under its sovereignty. In other words, Serbia still insists 
on Kosovo’s status should be finalized on the basis of less than autonomy, more than 
independence, so conditional independence to Kosovo will not be recognized by 
Serbia. The tactic of EU as offering EU membership as carrot, and in return making 
Serbia accept the conditional independence of Kosovo is problematic. Since, Serbia 
warns EU that it might withdraw from Stabilization and Association Agreement, de-
pending on the distinct politicians perspectives, Kosovo can be sacrificed for EU 
member-ship, or vice versa. Besides, prospect of membership as a carrot alone is not 
sufficient for dealing with Serbia, differences among the politicians about giving up 
Kosovo should also be taken into consideration. Therefore, EU should not assume that 
membership carrot can open every door or be the panacea for every matter and 
construct alternative strategies to cope with the cases where membership carrot is 
inadequate. 
 
Toschev and Cheikhameguyaz (2005: 290) discuss the results of replacing UNMIK 
with an EU mission in Kosovo. For identifying the new case, they coined the term EU 
mission in Kosovo. For the authors, EU protectorate can accelerate the pace of 
Kosovo’s development, implementation of SAP its integration and gradually its 
accession to EU. The authors underline the possibility of Kosovo “joining as an EU 
trusteeship territory and become independent over time.” The risk of delaying the 
solution of the final status problem within the framework of an EU interim 
administration should be overcome by EU (2005: 291). Toschev and 
Cheikhameguyaz substantiates EU mission in Kosovo as Kosovo being an EU 
protectorate. However, Kosovo is not a protectorate anymore in the sense that it 
gained independence conditionally. It is only for a short time that it will be controlled 
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by EU during the reconstruction, institution building process and minority protection. 
As long as the danger of Kosovo being a failed state vanishes from the agenda, then 
Kosovo will access to EU. Therefore, the argument of treating Kosovo as an EU 
protectorate is flaw given the role of EU mission in Kosovo is linked to the transition 
period.  
 
After the Serbia’s presidential election, EU members adopted a document on 4th of 
February 2008, which is consisted of 1800 officials including police and justice 
elements. The official name of the civilian crisis management mission is EULEX. 
EULEX is expected to remain in Kosovo for five to ten years and will cost 200 
million euros approximately for the first 16 months (Southeast European Times, 
5.2.2008). EU should be aware of the main challenges arising from taking the major 
responsibility in Kosovo. Given the US withdrawal from the Balkan stage, EU must 
be ready for the diplomatic, economic burdens. If EU is successful at institution 
building, and proves its capacity for dealing with the conflicts in its back yard, then 
EU will present itself as an important global player in the world politics, since its 
credibility will be tested and passed one of the tricky issues, Kosovo. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EUROPEAN UNION’S FUTURE ROLE IN RELATION TO 
KOSOVO: GOOD SCENARIOS 
 
 
Projection of the future by using scenarios is relevant in particular within the context 
of the role of European Union in Kosovo for various reasons. EU take over from the 
UNMIK is a testing ground for the capacity of EU in the fields of reconstruction, 
institution building, and conflict prevention. In other words, if EU manages to deal 
with the problems arising from the independence of Kosovo; such as the risk of 
escalation of an armed conflict among Serbia and Kosovo, fragility of Bosnia’s and 
Macedonia’s territorial integrity, then EU would be one of the decisive actors in the 
world politics. Secondly, attention of US from the Balkans was diffused due to the 
September 11 attacks, war on terror; therefore EU must fill the gap in the region. 
Thirdly, based on the EU strategy of offering membership perspective to South 
Eastern European countries, it is assumed the conflicts among these states which are 
threats to a stable, secure Europe will be removed from the agenda. Consequently, the 
success of EU take over in Kosovo will be the determinant factor for the stability, 
prosperity of the Balkans. In order to scrutinize the range of component’s influence on 
the future role of EU in the Kosovo issue, scenarios are essential. These scenarios 
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provide the room for calculation in EU policies by giving the implication of distinct, 
probable outcomes of EU engagement in Kosovo. Nature of the scenarios can be 
classified in two groups which are good scenarios, and nightmare scenarios. Good 
scenarios about the future role of EU in relation to Kosovo are the following: 
Kosovo’s independence and its membership to EU together with Serbia, and 
Kosovo’s independence and membership in European Union while Serbia remaining a 
pariah. Nightmare scenarios about the future role of EU in Kosovo issue are:  the 
perpetuation of status quo and the deterioration of the status quo. This chapter will 
focus on the good scenarios about EU’s future role in Kosovo issue, and it has two 
subsections. 
 
Good scenarios on EU’s role in relation to Kosovo have the sine qua non conditions 
which are in particular connected to Kosovo’s performance not only in internal 
reforms such as in economic, political and legal sphere, that is the meeting of 
standards for Kosovo, and Copenhagen criteria, but also Kosovo’s commitment to the 
preservation of the existing borders. In other words, a multi ethnic Kosovo is the most 
crucial grounding of full-fledged independent Kosovo and its accession to EU in the 
medium term. For achieving this objective, a tolerant, prosperous atmosphere is 
required. Also, within this framework integration of Serbian minority in the society, 
and cutting the parallel structures with Belgrade is vital. In this sense, decentralization 
and inclusion of the Serbian elements in Kosovo administration, judiciary, public 
sector and return of refugees and ensure their safety might be helpful.  
 
The last condition that needs to be mentioned for a good scenario is the creation of an 
economically viable Kosovo, which will have three implications. The first one is: If 
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economy of the country is viable, and the distribution of wealth among the society is 
in equal terms, as a result the minorities will not feel discrimination and the prosperity 
can make them feel more secure and belonged to the state of Kosovo. By this I rely on 
the assumption of economic enhancement can bring political development as well. All 
the people in Kosovo will also enjoy equal access in health, education. The second 
implication of an economically strong Kosovo is: Employment will rise among the 
society, especially young population; thus they will neither be involved in organized 
crime activities, and nor they are more inclined to ultra- nationalist aspirations. The 
need of a scapegoat figure to divert the attention of the public from economy by the 
politicians will not occur, and the minorities will not be interrupted, since a “common 
enemy” rhetoric will not be on the agenda. Thirdly, as long as the Kosovo’s economy 
is viable, and there is adequate level of employment for the people, there is no risk for 
a mass migration, refugee flow for states like Greece, Italy and other EU member 
countries.  
 
Delevic (2007: 72) indicates the necessity of a political state of normality for a stable 
and prosperous Western Balkan region, Kosovo issue is the most crucial obstacle in 
this realm:  
 The economic development of Kosovo, which is totally surrounded by the 
region and hence in the long run politically and economically dependent 
on it and especially on the immediate neighbors, would be impossible 
without a state of political normality in the region. The same holds true for 
further trade liberalization and transport integration as well as full 
exploitation of the energy potential of the region. Therefore, the political 
status of Kosovo will have to be resolved in a way which will not preclude 
regional cooperation. 
 
Under EU supervision, Kosovo will be stable in terms of political, economic and 
social aspects during the transition stage. Again, EU should continue to its 
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commitment to enlargement to the South Eastern Europe, extension of the zone of 
stability, prosperity to the region. 
 
Another key factor which will contribute to the realization of good scenarios is the 
task of Albania as a stabilizing factor. This covers Albania’s responsible attitude to 
respect Kosovo as an independent political entity, and not think of union with it. In 
addition, Shembilku (2004: 59) underlines Albania’s diplomatic efforts for a stable 
Macedonia and Monte-negro “where Albanians are not treated as second class 
citizens but within the guidelines of international law.” Dassu (2001: 43) points out 
the impact of Tirana’s attitude on “marginalization of extremist elements and offer 
incentives for Kosovars for playing a responsible role.” Therefore, Albania as a 
stabilizing factor in the region does her best in every circumstance, in accordance with 
international law, and harmonizes her interests with Euro-Atlantic structures. 
 
Good scenario has the component of no unification of Kosovo with other entities like 
Albania proper, Albanian populated areas of Macedonia. Besides, no formation of a 
greater Albania, greater Kosovo is on the agenda. Therefore, under the Ahtisaari plan 
the territorial integrity of Macedonia is guaranteed by prohibition of modification of 
existing borders of Kosovo. Due to the provisions of the same plan, Kosovo will not 
be partitioned too. Furthermore, as a result of international community’s not 
supporting the partition alternative given the independence of Kosovo, Serbia can not 
demand unification with Re-public Srpska in Bosnia as compensation. Hence, 
territorial integrity of Bosnia is at least theoretically not at stake and further 
disintegration in the Balkans can be avoided. Given the Kosovo’s renunciation of 
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changing the borders officially, the projects like Greater Kosovo, greater Albania and 
their deadly results can be prevented from taking place as well. 
 
Serbian domestic politics will be decisive in the accomplishment of a good scenario. 
As soon as the pro-EU wing is totally in charge of the administration of the country, 
and the other politicians understand that Kosovo is a burden for the economic 
development of Serbia, and hampers the EU road, then, no one will blame the other as 
betraying the national cause. Also, the war criminals Radko Mladic and Radovan 
Karadzic should be delivered to Hague tribunal, in that case EU will initiate 
Stabilization and Association Agreement for Serbia, thus the process of its inclusion 
to the EU will take place. Rejection of the possibility of use of force for taking 
Kosovo back has already been a good sign for the stability of the Balkans. 
 
 
4.1. Kosovo’s independence and its membership to EU together with Serbia 
 
The conditional independence and EULEX mission had been discussed in the 
previous chapter; so I will not restate them in detail, but I will give brief information 
about Kosovo’s independence and the significance of recognition issue for a 
prospective EU member-ship. Under EU supervision, Kosovo’s independence and the 
matters arising from the transition period like state and institution building, meeting 
of Standards for Kosovo will be managed. Despite the fact that Kosovo’s 
independence relies on the conditions, after the transition period it will be genuine. 
Since independence of Kosovo is now realized, an important part of the good scenario 
appears as a fact, rather than a projection. However, the issue of recognition is 
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problematic in the sense that member states like Spain, Cyprus, Romania and 
Slovakia have not recognized the Kosovo state. On the other hand, France, Italy, 
Germany, United Kingdom had already recognized Kosovo. Therefore, disunity on 
the issue of recognition should be overcome in a short while, and a new framework 
for coping with the member states that will not recognize Kosovo. By this I mean the 
continuation of the prospect of membership to Western Balkan countries, including 
Kosovo. A statement from Der Spiegel (19 February 2008: United We Fall: EU 
Divisions Shine in Kosovo Agreement) illustrates this:  
 
After all, the countries of the Western Balkans all have a “European 
perspective” a phrase which holds out the carrot of eventual EU 
membership. Kosovo too has been courted with the possibility of EU 
accession- even if a number of its members do not even recognize the 
baby state’s existence. 
 
 
O’Brien (2006: 79-80) indicates the troublesome situation which is giving Kosovo a 
road map for “the prospect of a SAA, and a promise that EU member states will 
recognize Kosovo as a state by the time that the SAA is signed.” While evaluating this 
condition, there is one thing to bear in mind, which is the danger of a “delay on 
recognition as a state until the completion of road map could cause any EU member 
state to stop the SAA and membership process by refusing recognition.” The possible 
outcome of this situation will be an unwilling Kosovo for meeting European standards 
given the lack of the membership horizon. The author proposes immediate recognition 
of Kosovo as a state, in order not to blur the membership process later. 
 
An independent Kosovo and its EU membership together with Serbia is in fact the 
most ideal and desired scenario. I have discussed the recognition trap because so far 
this is one of the most serious threats for the occurrence of the ideal scenario for the 
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prosperity, stability of Europe. Furthermore, USA is in favor of the option of the 
“implementation of Ahtisaari proposals including supervised independence. Within 
this context, the statement of US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice is worth to be 
reflected: “I want to be very clear that we see a future in which Kosovo and Serbia are 
both strong and free and in which both are fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic 
horizon and Euro-Atlantic structures.” (Kosovo’s Final Status: A Key to Stability and 
Prosperity in the Balkans, US Department of State Fact Sheet, 23 January 2008). 
Another crucial statement that needs to be referred here is the statement by 
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who is the US Permanent Representative on Kosovo 
in the Security Council in 19 December 2007:  
 
A lack of resolution to Kosovo’s status is preventing the full integration 
of the Balkans into Europe… To achieve this integration, it is essential 
to solve the problem of Kosovo’s status; this is hampering both Serbia 
and Kosovo’s advancement. It is time to move forward to a brighter 
future where Serbia and Kosovo can be partners and neighbors, fully 
integrated into Europe.  
 
For Kosovo both the conditions of independence and the steps that need to be taken to 
path of EU integration are compatible, in fact they are the part of the same process. 
Be-sides, participation of minority to all aspects of Kosovo state, their equal access to 
public, private sector and non-discrimination policies in this realm will be productive. 
Since, this type of treatment to minorities especially to the Serbians, will avoid the 
parallel structures with Serbia proper, and the dangerous alternative of expulsion of 
the Serbs. Therefore, a Kosovo state with EU membership aspiration and meeting of 
the conditions of independence can decrease the possibility of further disintegration in 
the Balkans. Dassu (2001: 41) indicates “an accountable local leadership, enjoying 
popular support and answerable to both its constituents and international community” 
can claim the right to decide the final status of Kosovo. Within this context, approval 
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of Thaci as prime minister of Kosovo is meaningful, as during his first speech at the 
Kosovo parliament he said: “We are at the most important crossroads in our history as 
a country. We are in preparations that at the beginning of this year will turn Kosovo 
an independent state, a democratic country for all its citizens.” Thaci also spoke in 
Serbian so that he could demonstrate his commitment to a multiethnic Kosovo 
(Southeast European Times, Kosovo Parliament approves Thaci as Prime Minister, 
10.01.2008). In accordance with Dassu’s comment on an accountable leadership who 
can answer the need of Kosovo citizens and international community, so far Thaci is 
the right choice as an able, and responsible political leader who can embrace all of the 
Kosovo citizens regardless of ethnic background. The kind of gestures like repeating 
the speech in Serbian at the Parliament would be the signal of a genuine dedication to 
contribute Kosovo’s and the stability of entire region. Hence, even though there can 
be gradual integration with EU,  given Kosovo and Serbia had this kind of responsible 
leaders, they could enjoy good relations and can work together to reach their common 
goal, EU membership.  
 
The ongoing tensions and the danger of further disintegration in Serbia concerning 
southern Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo (partition option among Serbs in the north 
and Albanians in the south) can be prevented by the “reconciliation and democracy 
for the sake of the broader European project.”(Rupnik: 2001). As long as EU is a 
factor that brings cohesion, the further disintegration in the Balkans can be stopped. 
Maliqi (1998: 76) raises the point of EU has been designed on the basis of unification, 
due to lack of capacity of nation-states solving national and minority issues. Thus, the 
minority issues in the Balkans in particular Kosovo and Serbia can be resolved within 
EU framework. Veremis (2001: 95) states the irredentist agendas should be replaced 
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by regional development and EU membership perspective. Likewise, Trianthaphyllou 
(2001: 105) points out the common problems that Serbia and Kosovo have such as 
poverty, organized crime, weak state institutions. Kosovo and Serbia have the chance 
to have a constructive dialogue, and they can enjoy having a cooperative relationship, 
by following the German-French example which is the core of EU idea. Similarly, 
Batt (2005: 36) states the requirement of Serbs and Kosovars “modification of the 
positions and shift the focus from injuries of the past towards building a better future 
for their peoples.” Thus, in this sense, Serbia and Kosovo should discuss the common 
methods to solve these problems which are obstacles for accomplishing their common 
objective, EU membership.   
 
Glenny (2004: 90) emphasizes the importance of a democratic and stable Serbia as a 
stabilizing factor in the region because of Serbia’s impact on Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Croatia, Montenegro and Macedonia. The author also mentions about the new 
economic opportunities arising from Serbia’s EU membership. In addition, the war 
criminals Radko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic should be delivered to ICTY 
immediately; hence, EU can initiate SAA with Serbia. Glenny makes further 
evaluation on the reflection of EU integration process as not a “one-way process.” 
Given the continuation of reforms in Serbia, EU should be more helpful during the ac-
cession process. Kouchner, who is the French foreign minister and UN administrator 
of Kosovo said that: I don’t know by what date or in which year, but Kosovo and 
Serbia will be together again in the EU.”(International Herald Tribune, Behind the 
Scenes, EU Splits over Kosovo, 19 February 2008). Therefore, in line with one of the 
most influential states of EU, France declares the high possibility of the realization of 
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the ideal scenario on Kosovo issue, that is Kosovo’s independence and its 
membership to EU together with Serbia without giving a certain time. 
 
Kuci (2005: 162) affirms that Kosovo is a burden for Serbia, and if and when it 
declares independence and Serbia gets rid of it, as a consequence, democratization 
and prosperity, under EU horizon can appear. In this context, Kuci refers to Bugajski 
and Malcolm’s ideas which reflect the shift of the myth of Kosovo that is the chosen 
trauma in Volkan’s (2007 :) terms to a “more humane and critical manner which 
Serbian and Kosovar people benefit.” Sejdiu (2005: 84) points out the inclusive 
dimension of Serbia to the offering membership perspective to Western Balkan states:  
 
On its part, Brussels has vehemently proclaimed ever since the decline 
of Milosevic regime, that the doors for Serbia and Montenegro are open, 
as there should not be a “black hole” in the process of EU’s southeast 
expansion. To this end, the prospects of meaningful democratization of 
Serbia will, at least partially, depend on the degree to which Brussels, 
and other Western capitals, will offer “carrots and sticks” to Belgrade.  
 
In accordance with EU approach to Serbia, the feasibility study for signing of SAA 
has finished, however, due to the failure of Serbia to deliver war indictees to ICTY 
and their uncompromising stance on recognition of an independent Kosovo, the 
negotiations for SAA can not begin. Halbrook (2005: 3) explains Serbian dilemma 
with respect to make the right choice between giving up Kosovo, and EU 
membership:  
 
The Serbs will have to choose between trying to join the European 
Union and trying to regain Kosovo. If they seek their lost province, they 
will end up with neither. But, if it can opt for the future over the past, 
Serbia would have a bright future as an EU member, and the ancient 
dream of an economically integrated, peaceful Southeast Europe 
(including Greece and Bosnia) would be within reach. 
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Holbrook proposes EU to make Kosovo an integral part of the membership process on 
Serbia. As soon as the Serbian politicians make the right decision by recognizing the 
independence of Kosovo state, then the pace of EU integration process will gain 
momentum. Furthermore, EU wants settled borders and clearly defined states, which 
still Serbia lacks. Batt (2005: 7) raises the query of Serbia given the choice among 
“national question-Kosovo” and EU accession which has the priority. The author 
(2005: 8) thinks that Serbia must “redefine its national identity and statehood in order 
to become capable of integrating into the EU.” Copenhagen criteria and the extent of 
Kosovo’s meeting the conditions of independence can provide Serbs to pursue their 
legitimate interests in Kosovo such as in the areas of minority rights, property issues 
and cultural heritage (2005: 42). Also, Tziampiris (2005: 290) shares Batt’s ideas on 
the Serbia can both choose EU path and engagement on Serbian minority without “an 
autonomous region drawn upon ethnic lines.” Hence, one can conclude that Serbia via 
EU can monitor the well being of Serbian minority in Kosovo. Kosovo due to the 
commitment of a multiethnic identity of Kosovo and for the sake of meeting 
European standards would cooperate with Serbia. 
 
Both Kosovo and Serbia will be influenced by the uncertainty of the EU enlargement. 
Given the enlargement fatigue, a parallel can be drawn for the visualization of the 
ideal scenario that is Kosovo’s independence and its membership to EU together with 
Serbia. Toschev and Cheikhamgevuyaz (2005: 303) points out the problems arising 
from the uncertainty of EU’s future status about enlargement: 
If the EU cannot successfully reorganize itself to allow for the 
acceptance of new members, it can not offer membership to Serbia as an 
incentive for Serbia’s acceptance of the independence of Kosovo. 
Likely, there will simply be too little for Serbia to gain in letting Kosovo 
go.  
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Pond (2005: 19) talks about the impact of French referendum which is against 
anymore EU enlargement, “implicitly including Kosovo and Serbia.” The author 
states that the waning of membership prospect can trigger the old habit of violent 
conflicts in the region. O’Brien (2006: 79) claims that Serbia should be one step 
forward from Kosovo in the path to EU membership. However, I do not agree with 
this claim because if Kosovo and Serbia join simultaneously, they will be much aware 
of the fact that any act of violence, discrimination derails the membership process. 
According to International Crisis Group Report No.161, Serbs should be refrained 
from the message that “the train is leaving with or without you”. Since, prospect of 
EU membership is so far the only viable option as a peaceful solution to Kosovo issue 
for both Kosovo and Serbia. 
 
The arguments about Greater Albania project will be discussed within the context of 
Kosovo’s independence and EU membership. Vickers (2008: 14) indicates that “the 
younger Kosovar Albanians have a separate Kosovar identity of their own and see 
joining the EU as a far more advantageous goal than any form of union with Albania.” 
Furthermore, Ragaru (2007: 54) underlines the belief among the Albanians in distinct 
parts of the Western Balkans believe that EU membership will give “all-Albanian 
inhabited lands to belong together in a larger entity, where freedom of movement will 
be the rule.” Therefore, as Kosovo and Albania proper have distinct identities and 
most of the Albanians think that EU as a common roof, as a result the nightmare of 
greater Albania disappears given the EU membership.  
 
The election in Serbia was a kind of referendum on Serbian relations with EU. Pro-
EU candidate Tadic won and EU declared its intention on accelerating Serbia’s EU 
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integration. Tadic did not attempt to use of force to stop the declaration of Kosovo’s 
independence. However, Kostunica wanted the renewal of the elections due to the 
pro-EU ministers in the government. From Kostunica’s perspective, EU bribes Serbia 
while Kosovo is the price for membership. In this sense, pro-EU ministers sell the 
national cause-Kosovo- to achieve EU membership. An able and responsible 
president of Serbia, like the Thaci the Prime Minister of Kosovo, can be the most 
valuable card in winning the game with EU, where the reward is the membership. As 
a consequence, Thaci and Tadic should be backed by EU so that they can be the 
factors who contribute to the stability, prosperity of their countries via the channel of 
EU accession. 
 
As I have already mentioned, Kosovo’s independence and membership to EU together 
with Serbia is the most ideal scenario on resolving Kosovo issue. But, the hope of the 
realization of this scenario will be affected by multiple factors such as continuation of 
Southeast enlargement of EU, domestic politics in Serbia and Kosovo, Kosovo’s 
fulfillment of conditions of independence, Serbia’s stance on not using force and not 
eruption of violence among the Albanian and Serbian communities in Kosovo. 
Therefore, despite the challenges concerning the realization of the ideal scenario, the 
rewards are so crucial that they can not be left aside. 
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4.2. Kosovo’s independence and membership to EU with Serbia remaining a 
pariah 
 
This is a deviant form of the ideal scenario; however it can still be considered as a 
good scenario. Kosovo’s independence and membership to EU with Serbia remaining 
a pariah is a strong possibility given the Euro-skeptics, rise in ultra-nationalism and 
the image of pro-EU leaders of Serbia as betraying the Serbia’s national cause, and 
the power of Radical Party. As the best strategy for EU is to exit from Kosovo when it 
is a member of EU, if Serbia insists on the claim of not recognizing Kosovo, and 
freezes the relations with EU. In this scenario, Kosovo will be the winner so this will 
be a zero sum game for Serbia. Since Kosovo is now independent and is under EU 
supervision, then it will be though gradually become integrated to EU. Therefore, as 
long as Serbia misses the chance of EU integration path, and follows a non-
compromising stance, it is against Serbia’s interests for two reasons. Firstly, Kosovo 
has already been independent and recognized by important states like USA, UK, 
France, Italy and so forth. Hence, if Serbia’s choice is in line with isolation, and 
freezing the ties with EU, and there is no option of the reversal of Kosovo’s status, 
Serbia will lose its entire chance to pursue its legitimate interests such as preservation 
of Serbian minority in Kosovo.  
 
In the first part of this section, I will focus on Serbia’s image as pariah, their 
victimization perception, from the era of Milosevic. Then, I will deal with the 
divisions among Serbian domestic politics about Kosovo. Lastly, I will examine the 
implications of the two diverse orientations of Serbian leadership: Pro-EU, seeing 
Kosovo as burden, and pro-democratization versus Euro-skeptical, pro- Russian, 
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extreme nationalist, perceives Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, isolationist and 
remains of Milosevic regime. 
 
Uzgel (2001: 1) stresses the positive qualities of Tito’s Yugoslavia such as; being 
outside of Soviet Union’s monitor, its treatment to distinct nationalities. On the other 
hand, Milosevic‘s reign changed the whole picture “With Milosevic’s Yugoslavia all 
of these characteristics turned upside down and, the once respected and prestigious 
country of the Cold War years and the most likely EU candidate among the East 
European countries became the pariah state of the 1990’s.” Engert (unknown date: 55) 
states that Yugoslavia under Milosevic regime was “an ultimate pariah regime” which 
has the Milosevic control on army, judiciary. Engert uses Pridham’s ideas on this 
matter. Milosevic does not only use intimidation of the opponents as a tactic, but also 
he manipulates the media. Like Engert, Uzgel emphasizes the Milosevic’s Yugoslavia 
was a “challenge to the basic tenets of the New World Order.” Yugoslavia under 
Milosevic rule was a European Rogue state in both Uzgel’s and Engert’s analyses. 
The lack of democratic standards, and the respect for human rights, as well as the 
criminalization of the economy of the state, created the fertile ground for organized 
crime in the Balkans. Therefore, the four cycles of wars that Serbia lost under 
Milosevic which occurred due to the unrealistic Greater Serbia project, economic 
sanctions by the West and US involvement to stop the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo.  
 
Triantaphyllou (2001: 104) indicates the shift in international community for Serbs, 
due to the Albanian involvement in the increase in violence in Macedonia, Kosovo 
proper and southern Serbia. The author mentions that with the overthrow of Milosevic 
regime, Serbs are no longer treated as the pariah of the Europe. Return to Europe was 
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the slogan of some Serbian elite and EU. Serbia is included in Stabilization and 
Association Process. Despite the recent shifts that take place in Serbia, EU can not 
start the initial of SAA since Serbia fails to comply with the deliver of war indictees 
Mladic and Karadzic. So far, no development occurred and this was a precondition to 
start the SAA. Thus, one can claim that Serbia is the only one who can open the road 
to EU by delivering the war indictees to ICTY. Otherwise, Serbia will be excluded 
from the Stabilization and Association Process; as a consequence, it may not be 
integrated to EU. Thus, at least in the fulfillment of this condition, it is up to Serbia to 
decide to continue with EU or become the pariah of the Europe by missing the train. 
 
O’Brien (2006: 77) suggests that most of the Serbian politicians are still attached to 
the nationalist agenda that caused a lot of trouble for the country during the 1990’s. 
Now that both Kosovo and Montenegro are independent, this can trigger the 
ultranationalist tendencies in Serbia, “especially if the EU is perceived to have 
fostered the breakup of what remains of Yugoslavia.” In accordance with the Greater 
Serbia project, which includes large part of Bosnia, Kosovo, some parts of Croatia 
and Macedonia, but it lacks the support of Serbian public.  
 
Batt (2005: 65) underlines the fact that Kosovo’s place in the Serbian culture, history 
and as a myth is undermining the perception of the Serbs. The loss of Kosovo is 
equivalent to the loss of national dignity, and causes humiliation. Likewise, Pond 
(2007: 1) states that “resentment, self-pity and the want of revenge among the Serbs 
and their self –identification as both the rightful Balkan hegemony but also the special 
victims on Balkan history.” The strength of the Radical Party in Serbia can be linked 
to the victimized sentiment of Serbs, and the extreme nationalist tendencies in order 
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not to betray the national cause by giving up Kosovo. Pond (2005: 28) refers to the 
popularity of the Radical Party and argues that “the Germanic Protestant honesty in 
admitting broader culpability is rare among the Serbs.” In line with this view, Serbian 
public and politicians should take the responsibility of the fatal faults of Milosevic. 
Pond (2005: 32) points out that given the EU assurance and the removal of Kostunica 
from the government, “Serbia might still catch up after their lost decade and half as a 
pariah and stubborn non-player in the EU game, if Belgrade also pays the other price 
of extraditing Mladic and Karadzic to The Hague.” Therefore, within this framework, 
Serbs should be adapted to the loss of Kosovo given the assurances from EU to be 
included in the EU family. In order to avoid creating a new, victimized image for the 
Serbs, offering EU membership perspective is essential. Besides, if EU takes Serbia in 
as a member, then the self- identification of the Serbian public and the country will 
not be poisoned by being suppressed by the international community, Serbia will not 
become the pariah of the Europe. 
 
There are two distinct perspectives on Serbian domestic politics orientation which 
also has an impact on the foreign policy formulation of the country. The first one is 
pro-EU, seeing Kosovo as burden, and pro-democratization which is lead by Boris 
Tadic. The second one is Euro-skeptical, pro- Russian, extreme nationalist, perceives 
Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia, isolationist and remains of Milosevic regime, 
Kostunica and the leader of the Radical Party are the chiefs of this wing. I will 
examine these distinct perspectives in the following parts.  
 
Pro- EU wing in Serbia which is exemplified by President Boris Tadic is on the side 
of trans-formation of Serbia into a liberal democracy. Maliqi (1998: 160) states that 
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“Kosovo sucks the future of Serbia, since it leads to constant militarization and 
prevents its true democratization.” In this sense, Kosovo is a burden for Serbian 
development in political and economic realms. Delay of democratization of Serbia 
influences its EU integration as well. However, even Tadic can not declare explicitly 
that Kosovo is a burden, and it should be let to go, since the label of selling the 
national cause is not easy to carry. There is a quarrel among the ruling coalition 
partners, Tadic’s Democratic Party and Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia. 
Despite the fact that they agree with the final status of Kosovo, their stances on EU-
Serbian ties diverge. Tadic thinks that there is no reason to break all the ties with EU, 
and the country should pursue EU integration process. Furthermore, Tadic knows that 
there is no alternative for Serbia in the region, other than EU. Isolation is not the 
suitable way of Serbian foreign policy objectives. EU offered an interim political 
agreement for Serbia; this is the temporary solution until Serbia fulfills the conditions 
of SAA. Tadic wants to sign it, but Kostunica does not want Serbia to sign that 
document because it would mean an indirect recognition of Kosovo’s independence. 
For instance, one of the close allies of Tadic, Djelic who is the Vice Prime Minister 
states that “Interim agreement with EU speeds up Serbia’s progress towards the EU, 
including gaining membership candidate status.” (Southeast European Times, 
11.02.2008) Tadic points out that it is only via EU that Serbia can pursue its interests 
about Kosovo. He said that: “I will never give up fighting for our Kosovo and I will, 
with all my might, fight for Serbia to join the European Union. “However, in reality 
these two ideas are incompatible with one another; thus Serbia will be the pariah of 
Europe as long as the policy of keeping Kosovo in Serbia is preserved. Also, Tadic 
refers to the frozen conflict phase with the countries that recognized Kosovo, whereas 
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this does not mean damaging diplomatic ties. Tadic is aware of the fact that this 
would jeopardize Serbia’s interests. (China View, 16.02.2008) 
 
Delay of signing SAA with EU does not only create dissatisfaction among Serbian 
public, but also it is destructing the mutual trust between EU and Serbia. Furthermore, 
redefining Serbian state and its return to Europe, by the reform steps that has taken so 
far, will not be realized without Serbia’s EU perspective. As a result, Serbia needs EU 
for finishing its democratic change. Batt (2005: 68) claims that Serbia’s meeting of 
EU conditionality will be decisive in the process of democratic transformation. The 
author states that EU conditionality and the changes take place in accordance with it 
are not easy to meet due to the difficulty of giving up sovereignty. Moreover, EU 
perspective can have a strong constraint for ultra-nationalist inclinations in Serbian 
politics. Therefore, EU should not be treated as an imperial power, but it should be 
perceived as a partner (: 66). 
 
Kostunica seems to be pro-EU in the beginning of his presidency after the removal of 
Milosevic but now he seems to be skeptical of EU policies towards Serbia. Though he 
still wants to be an EU member, however he is not ready to pay the price of the 
reforms, and deliver war indictees to the Hague Tribunal and so forth. For him, loss of 
Kosovo can not be tolerated and EU is the main responsible actor, so how can the EU 
membership claim go on under this condition is open to discussion. Kostunica follows 
a hardliner, ultra-nationalist rhetoric about Kosovo. He wants Serbia to freeze its 
relations with EU and US, within the framework of suspending diplomatic relations 
with states that recognize Kosovo, economic blockade of Kosovo and withdraw from 
Stabilization and Association Process. These movements will only cause Serbia’s 
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dismemberment, and make them pariah of the Europe. Judah (2006: 5) argues that, the 
presence of NATO troops in Bosnia and Kosovo will protect the stability of these 
lands, given the Serbia’s choice of isolation; Serbia can not harm anything else but 
itself. Kostunica during the government session in Belgrade on the 14th of February 
made the comment on the future of EU-Serbian relations:  
 
Serbia has always been in Europe and therefore nobody can bring it in or 
take it out, and Serbia should join the European Union as a whole, in the 
same way as others in this union. Serbia was requested to sit at the table 
of the European family, as the only state which got its seat through 
undignified trading and by sacrificing its memories, identity, Serbia can 
never agree on this.  
 
The weakening of pro-EU wing in Serbian politics, due to the soft power of EU is no 
longer believable in the eyes of Serbian public is a problem. For Serbia, Kosovo’s 
independence is against international law. A Serbian commentator, Gojgic made a 
statement in International Herald Tribune on 18th of February about this: 
 
By supporting Kosovo, the international community is making it 
difficult for main stream, outward-looking Serbs who wanted to align 
themselves with the EU. How can   we try and fight for EU values when 
French foreign minister calls Kosovo’s independence as a triumph for 
international justice, even as the EU breaks international law. 
 
Russian and Serbian relations within the context of EU position on Kosovo’s 
independence are strengthened. Furthermore, ongoing energy deals are the key of 
Serbian-Russian partnership. Russia seems a more reliable partner for Serbia due to 
its support in Kosovo issue, economy. This situation is dangerous for EU energy 
security, but US presence in Kosovo can be seen as a deterrent. Serwer (2005: 8) 
emphasizes that neither EU nor NATO want Serbia as a member with Kosovo 
unresolved. Hence, Russia remains their main option to Western world. Shemelev 
(2005: 15) points out that without Kosovo, its links Serbia is a damaged and weak 
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state. Moreover, its loss means the loss of fertile land rich in mineral and energy 
resources. The loss of energy resources could be compensated by the dealings with 
Russia.  
 
In conclusion, given the Serbian choice on EU integration versus isolation and closer 
ties with Russia, their self-identification and the way they handle the loss of Kosovo 
Serbia will be either fully incorporated into EU, or commit political suicide, becoming 
a pariah in Europe. Serbia is at a crossroads, and Kosovo issue will be the decider. 
Serbia signed SAA with EU eventually, but before the delivery of war indictees to the 
ICTY, there will be no progress with the declaration of EU candidate status. Due to 
SAA, there will be visa facilitation arrangements for Serbs. This transition process 
may be the last chance of Serbia to choose the EU way by fulfilling required criteria. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
EU’S FUTURE ROLE IN RELATION TO KOSOVO ISSUE: 
NIGHTMARE SCENARIOS 
 
 
The nightmare scenarios in relation to the projection of the future of Kosovo issue is 
of vital importance. As the probability of eruption of armed conflict among Kosovar 
Albanians and Serbs does not a threat to their security, but also this situation is 
dangerous for the stability, prosperity of the Balkans, and the entire European 
continent as well. Due to the influx of refugees, arms, drug trafficking, organized 
crime will find the fertile ground and thrive under this condition in the neighboring 
countries like Greece, Italy.  
 
Given an outbreak of violence, and the partition of Kosovo among the Serbs and 
Kosovar people, territorial integrities of Bosnia, Macedonia will be at stake. 
Republica Srpska in Bosnia will demand outright unification with Serbia, Albanian 
minority in Macedonia can want to unite with Kosovo. Modification of borders in the 
Balkan context may cause further disintegration, ethnic tensions. Therefore, the 
partition option should be put aside while resolving the Kosovo issue. Besides, 
partition is among the nightmare scenarios because of the danger of opening the 
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Pandora’s Box. In my opinion, partition of Kosovo would be like a suicide. Its 
independence, if well-managed is a source of stability, however if partition of the new 
state occurs, there will be more destabilizing effects. 
 
 Creation of mono-ethnic states in the Balkan scale by ethnic cleansing, repression of 
ethnic minorities is not possible due to the EU membership perspective, since 
protection of the minorities is one of the Copenhagen criteria. On the other hand, as 
soon as EU disengages from the prospect of Southeast European Enlargement for the 
reasons like enlargement fatigue, absorption capacity, economic problems, then there 
is no point for the Southeastern European countries to continue to democratic reforms. 
Furthermore, the credibility of EU in its own back yard will be damaged considerably. 
In addition, ultra-nationalist, autocratic leaders can find the fruitful atmosphere to 
manipulate the public and may resort to violence for their revisionist aims like 
modifying the borders. Within this framework, Kosovo and Serbia can be more 
inclined to fight since in Serbia Radical Party might win the elections and in Kosovo 
KLA can become powerful again. Also, economically viable Kosovo and Serbia will 
be less inclined to armed conflict, whereas economic matters in both countries may 
create fruitful environment for the extreme nationalists. EU disengagement from the 
region may decrease the foreign direct investment in both countries. Lastly, even if 
EU does not choose to disengage from the Balkans, the governments of Kosovo and 
Serbia may give up from integration with EU. In other words, this condition should be 
taken into consideration while constructing nightmare scenarios.  Hence, any shift in 
the direction of EU engagement from giving Southeast European countries the 
prospect of membership might increase the level of conflict, particularly among the 
Serbs and Kosovars; so this should be avoided. Any party in Serbia and Kosovo 
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which is against EU perspective, though very unlikely can try to make these states out 
of EU orbit; hence the hope of economic prosperity will be undermined as well.  
 
The terms of supervised independence should be implemented by the Kosovar 
authorities in full terms; otherwise the situation would be more complicated. Also, EU 
and NATO should check the extent of the level of implementation. If Serbian 
minority is forced to leave Kosovo, and Serbian cultural heritage is destroyed, in that 
case the motive of Serbs becomes legitimate. International community will have to 
answer their concerns too; so the reliability of NATO and EU is open to discussion 
from that time. Serbia can justify the use of force in order to suppress any wrongdoing 
to the Serbian minority and this can cause further violence. For instance, the March 
2004 unrests in Mitrovica were not only towards Serbian minority, but also KFOR 
troops were perceived as enemies. Therefore, the recurrence of such events should be 
prevented; there should not be violence against minorities, and international presence.  
 
Another crucial point while constructing dooms-day scenarios about Kosovo issue is 
the shift in Albania’s position. Up to now, Albania followed a responsible foreign 
policy and acted as a stabilizing factor. Albania wanted Kosovo’s independence, but 
did not demand unification; it also wanted Albanian minorities in the neighboring 
countries should be treated equally. But, this may change. Though only marginal 
people demand Greater Albania project now, given the increase in the support to this 
idea, and Albanian leadership decides to choose to unifying with Kosovo, then the 
armed conflict with Serbs, and Greeks seems inevitable, as the Greater Albania is a 
direct threat to the vital interests of Greece and Serbia. 
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After elaborating the nature and the patterns of nightmare scenarios in relation to role 
of EU about Kosovo, I will name the types: Perpetuation of status quo and 
deterioration of status quo. Perpetuation of status quo will cover the option of freezing 
the status of Kosovo without any modification. 2004 unrests in Mitrovica will be a 
sub-section of perpetuation of status quo, as this event became the turning point which 
clearly demonstrated how unsustainable the status quo is. Deterioration of the status 
quo means the worsening of the above stated factors like radicalization of Serbian and 
Kosovar domestic politics, expulsion of Serbian minority in Kosovo by force, shift in 
EU engagement in the Balkans, the suspension of implementing the conditions of 
Kosovo’s independence, serious economic problems in Kosovo and Serbia, any 
attempt to modify the existing borders, a change in Albania’s foreign policy priorities 
to form Greater Albania. 
 
 
5.1. Perpetuation of status quo 
 
After 1999 NATO’s Kosovo campaign, until the declaration of Kosovo’s 
independence, and the recognition of supervised independence in February 2008, 
there was UNMIK. The final status issue had been postponed to an unknown date in 
order not to cause instability in the region. In spite of the unbearable weight of these 
questions: To what extent is the status quo sustainable? Can the final status decision 
of Kosovo be delayed forever? What will be the main implications of perpetuation of 
status quo? Is it better to decide the final status at once? What are the effects of 
perpetuation of status quo for the neighboring countries like Bosnia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, and Albania? Will there be spill over effects to these countries? But, two 
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events are the turning points to affect the US and EU to agree upon deciding a way of 
resolving the final status of Kosovo. These are 2001 Macedonian crisis, and March 
2004 unrests in Mitrovica. 
The 2001 Macedonian crisis was among the reasons of not to come up with a final 
status decision, as Albanian minority in Macedonia may demand unification with an 
independent Kosovo. Remnants of KLA were also influential in ethnic confrontation 
in Macedonia. EU brokered Ohrid Accords among Macedonians and Albanian 
minority, since then EU had a stabilization mission there. However, the new Ohrid 
framework has not been internalized by the Macedonian authorities, and without EU 
conditionality there will be a reversal in this regard. Hence, Albanian minority given a 
discontent, discrimination can still demand unification with Kosovo.  
 
March 2004 unrests in Mitrovica clearly demonstrated the unsustainable aspects of 
the way that Kosovo issue had been handled. Mitrovica is a divided city among the 
Serbian and Albanian communities. Violence was not only directed to the Serbian 
minority, but also against KFOR. This was crucial in the sense that showing the 
discontent towards international community about the freezing the status of Kosovo. 
Serbian minority had set up parallel ties with Belgrade, and refused to take part in any 
event in Kosovo such as elections. Mitrovica events were both a rehearsal of an 
outbreak of violence and ethnic confrontation, which may be considered as a catalyst 
that can be resulted in expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo by force. Furthermore, it was 
a warning to the EU, NATO, USA that Kosovar Albanians are frustrated with the 
perpetuation of status quo that is the final status decision is urgent, and unless these 
actors do something to resolve this issue, the anger of Kosovar Albanians will be 
directed to them as well. Therefore, the credibility of NATO and EU will be 
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questioned, and they will not have the sufficient intensity of leverage to stop an 
eruption of a large scale armed conflict among Serbia and Kosovo. 
 
Another important factor that leads to reluctant stance of EU and USA is the impact 
of 9/11 events and Bush administration. There was an alteration of US involvement in 
the Balkans with the George W. Bush’s presidency. Moreover, 9/11 events changed 
the foreign policy priorities of US, within this context, the commitments to stability in 
the Balkans from the era of Clinton’s administration was left aside. USA diverted the 
economic and military assistance due to the focus on Afghanistan, Iraq. EU became 
the main actor which ensures the stability, security in the Balkans. On the other hand, 
given the split between EU members on the form of resolution of Kosovo issue, there 
have not been significant improvements. Besides, there is difference of opinion 
between US and EU, which is visible in Trans-Atlantic partnership. For instance, EU 
fears that US will recognize a unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence. This 
may trigger a reprisal by Serbia which relies on Russia’s diplomatic, military help. In 
addition, there are EU member states which are against to Kosovo’s independence 
either due to minorities, or danger of Kosovo being a precedent to secessionist claims. 
Halbrook (2005: 2) stresses the US impact on pushing EU for the terms of conditional 
independence of Kosovo. Thus, EU needs to discuss the Kosovo issue and can not 
finalize a common approach easily and choose to the tactic of procrastination. 
 
There are various politicians, scholars who have come to the common conclusion of 
the status quo in Kosovo is unsustainable. Zalmay Khalilzad in his statement in UN 
Security Council on December 19 2007 mentions that the positions of each side are 
irreconcilable; hence the status quo is unsustainable. Likewise, Holbrook (2005: 2) 
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refers to Burns statements during Contact Group meeting. Burns said that: “The 
situation in Kosovo was inherently unstable and, unless there was an acceleration of 
efforts to determine its final status, violence would probably rise, with NATO forces, 
including US troops, tied down indefinitely.” Similarly, Batt (2005: 35) states that 
“international community in the form of the Contact Group deems the status quo 
unsustainable.” Also, Tziampiris (2005: 286) underlines the fact that freezing the 
status issue is not a proper method since no party to the conflict wants to compromise, 
and the parties feel that the situation is unsatisfactory. Maliqi (1998: 40) refers the 
situation in Kosovo as “a state of neither war nor peace but still more war than 
peace.” The expression of Dassu (2005: 35) is striking because she describes the final 
status of Kosovo as a “hostage issue by definition.” This idea can be imp-lemented to 
the economic field as well. Democrat Senator Joseph Biden, during the opening 
statement on the hearing of Kosovo in November 2005 argues that the current status 
quo is impractical. Brimmer (2007: 35) uses the speech of Biden to show that 
“Kosovo’s economy remains a hostage of the province’s undefined legal status.” 
Also, Serbia’s economy is under pressure due to the ongoing defense expenses in 
Serbia’s budget and the unstable atmosphere is a threat to foreign direct investment. 
Lastly, in line with the main theme of Biden’s speech, Delevic (2007: 9) signifies 
maintaining the status quo may cause an escalation of conflict, and may disrupt the 
economic improvement in the region. Therefore, both Kosovo and Serbia are the 
hostages of the perpetuation of status quo, both in economic and political fields.  
 
Arguments about delaying the final status are criticized by some scholars, 
intellectuals. Dassu (2001: 35) reveals that buying time and wasting time are not 
same; what needs to be done in Kosovo issue is within the time limit to take the steps 
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to build self-rule in Kosovo. Rupnik (2001: 80) raises the same question concerning 
desirability of the perpetuation of status quo. For the author, the protectorates are 
means to gain time and to freeze a problem. However, he asks a further question: “But 
has time really been ‘gained’, and is one quite sure that one can ‘freeze’ the status 
quo?” Actually, buying time and prolonging the issue is the thing that Serbs want, so 
the strategy of international community coincides with the Serbs wishes. Türbedar 
(2007: 54) argues that Serbian tactic of freezing the status of Kosovo is doomed to 
fail. Cohen (2006: 2) too illustrates this point, for him Serbian solution of Kosovo 
issue that is more than autonomy, less than independence is in accordance with the 
preservation of status quo, and can not offer the necessary tools to deal with the 
problem effectively. 
 
The perpetuation of status quo creates the fertile ground for organized crime in 
Kosovo and Serbia as well. The lack of a functioning legal system, monitoring of 
borders are the reasons of the epidemic of organized crime. Pond (2005) suggests that 
given the institutional vacuum Albanian and Serbian mafias involved in distinct types 
of organized crime, and KFOR is not in the position to prevent them from taking 
place. As a result, more instability in the Balkans becomes apparent. Likewise, 
Eldridge (2001: 49) points out the worry of international community about the 
destabilizing effects of Kosovo’s independence in terms of the risk of “puppet 
regimes associate with organized crime.” Winther (2007: 93) emphasizes that due to 
the perpetuation of status quo means “further spreading of organized crime into the 
rest of the Europe.” Hence, organized crime and criminalization of the state is a 
pattern that is seen in Kosovo and Serbia as a consequence of institutional vacuum, 
monitoring of borders. The necessary precautions can not be taken while the 
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perpetuation of status quo is the main hind-rance because the clarification of final 
status will cause a state with functional borders, legal system and can cure the disease 
of organized crime with the help of NATO forces. 
 
Time does not curb Serbian-Kosovar Albanian antagonism, but increases the level of 
hatred. There is a mutual distrust among the two communities which can not be 
overcome without problems. Joseph (2005: 116) states that postponing the final status 
will not be the solution to Kosovo issue. “Kosovo will remain deadlocked by Serb 
fears and intransigence on one hand, Albanian frustrations and impatience on the 
other.” Maliqi (1998: 40) stresses that Europe’s and other international actors’ 
insistence for Albanians to continue to live under Serbian jurisdiction is problematic. 
The author’s analogy of a married couple who can no longer stand each other is 
funny, but it perfectly reflects the reality: 
 
A desperate situation, like a court order to a married couple who hate 
each other; and who can not live together, to share a flat. And if one of 
them wanted to partition the flat, the judge would say cynically: you will 
have your autonomous corner in that flat where you can cry your heart 
out.  
 
 
In parallel with this analysis, with the new Serbian constitution that declares Kosovo 
as a part of Serbian jurisdiction, and Kosovar Albanian wish to declare a unilateral 
independence seems to widen the rifts between the parties. International Crisis Group 
Report   124 issued in March 2002 underline the Albanian fears, and Serbs hopes of 
eventual reincorporation of Kosovo to Serbia. Within this context, Serbs and 
Albanians will perceive each other as a threat. Even though these evaluations have 
been made in 2002, they are still valid now. Winther (2007: 94) argues that KLA 
legacy is the cause of distrust of the Serbian minority: 
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From an Albanian point of view, the KLA- heritage is seen as something 
natural, but from the Serbian point of view, it has meant a complete lack 
of legitimacy of the new political and public establishment in Kosovo, 
now perceived by Serbs as being run by criminals. 
 
Bumci (1999: 61) highlights the flaw association between the removal of Milosevic 
and the change of Serb society its position to Kosovo. The author exemplifies the 
Milosevic legacy is still valid, since the new leader Kostunica thought in the same 
way of the former president. As a consequence, perpetuation of the status quo only 
contributes to the additional enmity, doubt between the two parties. Therefore, 
Milosevic and KLA heritages are the sources of cynicism, and can be exacerbated 
rather than be curbed as long as the final status of Kosovo remains vague. 
 
Perpetuation of status quo for the sake of preserving regional security and stability is 
in fact undermines the countries like Bosnia, Macedonia and leads to more instability. 
Risk of a new Balkan war due to the discontent parties in Kosovo issue who hate each 
other can be more prone to be manipulated by the extreme nationalist rhetoric. If a 
war breaks up due to Kosovo among Albanians and the Serbs, this can have spill over 
effects to Bosnia, Macedonia, Monte-negro, and Albania proper. Dassu (2001: 39) 
comments on the negative impacts of freezing the final status of Kosovo would 
destabilize Macedonia, and may disrupt Serbia’s transition period to democracy. As 
2001 events in Macedonia demonstrated that unresolved Kosovo issue is like a Demo 
clean sword on the top of the territorial integrity of the country. Batt (2005 : 45) uses 
the view point of Macedonian President about the current status quo, without 
clarifying the final status of Kosovo is more destabilizing for Macedonia than 
Kosovo’s independence. As long as the borders remains fixed, controlled and KLA 
remnants do not take part in violent activities in Macedonia, then the situation is 
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acceptable for Macedonia as well. Likewise Joseph (2005: 114) mentions that 
vagueness over Kosovo’s final status disrupts the “public confidence in the stability of 
Macedonia.” For instance, South East European Times highlights the appearance of 
militant groups in Kosovo and these groups show signs of fueling unrest in 
Macedonia. Albanian minority in Macedonia did not want outright independence or 
unification with Kosovo during the 2001 events, therefore given the full 
implementation of Ohrid Accords; it is unlikely that they will pursue the goal of 
independence.  
 
Bosnian territorial integrity is fragile because of the perpetuation of status quo. 
Republica Srpska wants to declare independence, though in accordance with the 
provisions of Dayton Agreement it is prohibited. Serbs demand unification with the 
Serbian entity in Bosnia, and see this option as a compensation to the loss of Kosovo. 
Sejdiu (2005: 90) points out that allowance of Serbs secession from Bosnia will mean 
“legitimization of the Serbia’s genocidal campaign to expand its state frontiers.” 
Besides, secession of Republica Srpska is beyond the approval of international 
community. Actually, Serbs persistence will be their trouble in the sense that the wish 
of partition of a country is a bad precedent for territorial integrity of Serbia too given 
the large number of Albanians in the Presevo Valley. Hence, Serbs can only use 
disruption of territorial integrity of Bosnia as leverage to international community, but 
they can not dare to commit suicide as the same weapon may shut them too.  
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5.1.1. March 2004 Unrests in Mitrovica: Rehearsal of a Full-Scale Ethnic 
Turmoil  
 
I have already explained the relationship between the uncertainty of the future of the 
status of Kosovo and the risk of further instability because of ethnic confrontation 
among Albanians and Serbs. March 2004 unrests in Mitrovica can be conceived as a 
rehearsal of a full-scale ethnic turmoil. These events are also a crack to the efforts of 
building multi-ethnical structure for Kosovo. Furthermore, 2004 unrests are striking 
since the hatred and violence was not only directed to the Serbs, Roma minority but 
also to the international presence namely KFOR. The frustration among the Kosovar 
Albanians due to the undetermined final status of Kosovo became uncontrollable and 
the extreme nationalists made use of this atmosphere.  
 
It is important to bear in mind that Mitrovica is on the focus of partition scenario of 
Kosovo between Serbs and Kosovars. Any ethnic confrontation in the mixed 
population, which is divided in ethnic lines, will serve the Serbian wishes. In this 
sense, Serbs are more likely to provoke Albanian hatred, nationalist sentiments to 
achieve the goal of extending their borders by partitioning Kosovo. Under these 
circumstances, Kosovar Albanians become angrier, less tolerant to the existence of 
Serbian minority. Kosovar Albanians are aware of the fact that treatment to Serbian 
minority is the main condition of the supervised independence now, so they changed 
their policies accordingly. However, it is hard to curtail the antagonism, hatred among 
the Albanians and Serbs.  
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March 2004 unrests in Mitrovica broke out as a result of a false report which talks 
about Serb gangs which assaulted Albanian children. While the children were trying 
to escape from the Serbs, they went to the river and three of them drowned. Despite 
the outcry and rapid spread of the news in Kosovar Albanian media, the report proved 
to be false. In other words, there was not such an act of violence towards Albanian 
children occurred. Once provoked, the anger can not be monitored easily. In this 
context, Albanians demolished properties, public facilities like hospitals, schools. 
There were forceful evacuations of Serbian houses, which are either burned or 
forcefully occupied. The results of the events are reported by Kofi Annan, to the 
Security Council.5This event was a signal to the minorities or returnees that they are 
not welcomed in Kosovo. Also, displacement of Roma and Ashkali were a serious 
matter. Hence, in order to prevent the recurrence of such events like March 2004 
unrests, conditions of the Kosovo’s independence are certain on the topics of minority 
treatment, and protection of cultural heritage of Kosovo.  
 
Batt (2005: 39) stresses that Kosovar Albanian political leadership failed to condemn 
the violence immediately. Despite this fact, the new leader Thaci knows that for 
achieving the goal of EU membership, and the preservation of independence and 
recognition, he must be responsible. If events like 2004 unrests happens again that the 
minorities are attacked by Albanians, at least in rhetoric acts of Thaci will be more 
likely to condemn the violence at once. Thus, March 2004 unrests should be a lesson 
for Kosovar Albanians, the leaders, and the Kosovar Albanian media because of the 
danger and the lethal results of the recurrence of such events.  
                                                 
5 According to the report of Kofi Annan issued in 30 April 2004 in UN Secuirty Council: A total of 19 
persons died in the violence, of whom 11 were Kosovo Albanians and 8 were Kosovo Serbs, and 954 
persons were injured in the clashes. Approximately 730 houses belonging to minorities, mostly Kosovo 
Serbs, were damaged or destroyed. 36 monasteries, churches were attacked.  
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European Stability Initiative prepared a report on June 2004 about the Lausanne 
Principle, which reflects the multi-ethnicity, and the future of Kosovo’s Serbs. For the 
authors of the report, March 2004 unrests show the influence of extreme nationalist 
sentiments to reach political aims by using violent methods. Young Albanians are 
open to the manipulation of these extremists and this should be taken into account. 
The manipulation of Albanians is just the thing that Serbs wanted so that the Serbian 
leaders can justify an attack to Kosovo. Any attempt to resort to violence to keep 
Mitrovica from Albanian or Serbian control make the conflict a zero sum game. ESI 
Discussion paper (ESI, 2006: 1) refers Mitrovica as Kosovo’s Litmus Test: 
 
Mitrovica is Kosovo’s Litmus Test. It is here that Guiding Principles set 
down by the Contact Group- no partition, decentralization, returns and 
multiethnic Kosovo- will face their toughest test. It is in Mitrovica that 
Kosovo leadership must prove that its commitment to a multiethnic 
society is more than rhetorical.  
 
However, the fears of Kosovo Albanians about the division of Mitrovica can be a 
stepping stone to the partition of Kosovo should not be overlooked. Both the attempts 
of decentralization on the basis of the proposals of Ahtisaari and the Albanian 
concerns should be managed. The problems arising from the perpetuation of status 
quo have the danger to appear again in a worse form, deterioration of the status quo. 
 
 
5.2. Deterioration of status quo 
 
Deterioration of status quo includes Kosovo’s partition, forceful expulsion of Serbian 
minority, and Serbia’s reprisal by use of force to take Kosovo back, Kosovo’s 
 73
unification with Albania or territories secede from Macedonia and Serbia, shift in EU 
enlargement perspective in Southeast Europe. If Kosovo’s independence and its 
implications in the region can not be controlled by EU, one or multiple of the above 
mentioned events come true, then dooms day scenarios about the Kosovo issue will 
begin to flourish. The ongoing status quo has already been fragile and difficult to 
handle. I will examine different forms of deterioration of status quo. Some forms and 
the results of deterioration of status quo overlap, so I will focus on those connections 
as well. 
 
 
5.2.1. Economic Problems 
 
Economic problems are visible both in Kosovo and Serbia. Delevic (2007: 51) uses 
ERBD Strategy for Serbia’s estimation of the level of GDP per capita that is 1.100 
euro in 2007. The common problems among the two countries are high level of 
unemployment particularly among the young population. Besides, according to the 
analysis of Reinvest Institute for Kosovo, any growth rate which is smaller than 7 per 
cent per year will breed economic and indirectly political instability. Winther (2007: 
92) addresses the main sectors in Kosovo’s economy are farming, mining, but these 
sectors are obsolete. The author notes that (2007: 92) “there is no real prospects of 
improvements, unless the economy is injected with massive investments from the 
outside.” Therefore, attraction of foreign direct investment is of utmost importance for 
Serbia and Kosovo’s economy. 
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Kosovo and Serbia are dependent on the business transactions with US and EU states. 
In this sense, when Serbia threatened to break relations with US and EU member 
states due to the Kosovo, Serbia should think twice and be aware of making a tough 
decision. Hence, Serbia should not risk the well being of its economy, and not subvert 
its economic interests.  
 
Kosovo is in need of strong institutions and infrastructure to develop its economy so 
that more jobs can be generated and welfare be distributed. So far, administrative 
system offers encouraging conditions for private enterprises. But, Schmidt (2008: 30) 
points out the failures in “the judicial system, unresolved property issues, and 
infrastructural deficiencies (especially the unreliable electric supply)” still disrupt the 
private enterprises. Thus, in order to create a viable Kosovo in economic terms, EU 
and OECD should work together and contribute to the infrastructure and institution 
building. 
 
There is a direct relationship between the danger of ethnic violence and deterioration 
in social and economic conditions. Within this framework, high unemployment rates 
among the young populations of Serbia and Kosovo, given the general dissatisfaction 
and frustration in the society, is open to manipulation by the extremists and are more 
prone to resort to violence. In line with this situation, Mitrovica continues to be the 
spot of tension among Albanians and Serbs not only in inter-ethnic strife, but also 
economic problems. In fact, European Stability Initiative portrays the region as a 
development challenge. According to the report, it is highly likely that foreigners and 
donors in Mitrovica will vanish given the ongoing danger of ethnic violence. 
Furthermore, the population will decline and economic problems exacerbate. “Any 
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reduction in transfers from Belgrade, in particular, could lead to an exodus of the 
Serbian elite.” (European Stability Initiative Discussion Paper, 2006: 6) This state 
have various implications such as; the continuation of poverty, economic decline, 
unemployment, thrive of inter-ethnic violence, disruption of the hope of catching 
foreign direct investment and the end of multi-ethnic ideal for Kosovo that is imposed 
by the European Union.  
 
Finally, the danger of renewed violence between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs deter 
the level of investment in the neighboring countries like Albania, Montenegro, and 
Macedonia as well. For instance, Vickers (2008: 24) indicates that the possibility of 
renewed violence in Kosovo damages the improvement of tourism in Albania. Hence, 
NATO and EU should assure that there will not be a new war so that a healthy 
business climate can flourish in Southeastern Europe. Otherwise, Kosovo, Serbia will 
be backward economically and the whole region will face political and economic 
instability. 
 
 
5.2.2. Organized Crime 
 
Eldridge (2001: 49) underlines that international community is right to worry about 
the further criminalization of states which are governed by the leaders who are deeply 
involved in organized crime. Kosovo had already become the main route of women, 
drug, and arms trafficking. Even though, Kosovo is not the only state whose economy 
is dependent on the revenue from organized crime, the rise in the number of states 
which can not control its borders really bothers the prospect of economic development 
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and security of the Balkans. As a consequence, renewed violence may cause refugee 
flows throughout the Europe and the disorder may offer the organized crime networks 
the suitable environment for the spread of organized crime.  
 
Secondly, organized crime causes corruption and this leads to the failure of 
democratic institutions. Unemployed young population perceives that organized crime 
activities are means of being rich in a short time, so they are more willing to take part. 
Also, Winther (2007: 93) argues that the main reason of the spread of organized crime 
is the insufficiency of the KFOR and international police forces to control it. The 
author states that “If 18-45,000 KFOR troops and UNMIK’s 3-4,000 international 
police officers can not eliminate or contain this organized crime, what would happen 
if these left Kosovo as a part of the solution?” Hence, NATO and EU must ensure the 
border control; strengthen the economic development and democracies in South 
Eastern Europe. Once achieved, economic prosperity and political stability should not 
be undermined by the hands of extremist politicians, since Kosovo, Serbia and the rest 
of the South Eastern Europe can no longer bear the burden of a renewed violence. 
 
 
5.2.3. Disruption of Ideal of Multi-Ethnic State Model in Kosovo 
 
Any attempt to damage the multi-ethnic structure of Kosovo means an extra step 
towards deterioration of status quo. Delevic (2007: 55-56) argues that the current 
trade regime in Kosovo and Serbia creates economic gains for only one group. In 
other words, within the realm of economy, the trade transactions should be built in 
order to foster multi-ethnic partnerships. By this method, both trade within Kosovo 
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among Albanians and Serbian minority and the trade between Serbia and Kosovo can 
produce the economic stability. However, if the current status quo continues, there is 
no room for such positive development; rather there will be more social, political, and 
economic instability. Therefore, commitment to multi-ethnic structure of Kosovo can 
be a catalyst in generating peace in the region; conversely its disrupt-ion will trigger 
more insecurity. 
 
Batt (2005: 50) indicates that March 2004 unrests and the reactions of Kosovar 
Albanian leaders are not enough to condemn the events. Moreover, the author claims 
that by not taking necessary measures, the Kosovar Albanian leaders proved that they 
are not really committed to the goal of achieving multicultural Kosovo. As I have 
explained previously, March 2004 unrests demonstrate that under the current 
circumstances no multi-ethnic structure is viable in Kosovo. In line with this 
argument, recurrence of events like March 2004 unrests, and the renewal of the 
Kosovar Albanian politicians’ attitude will mean that EU policy to offer membership 
perspective and the creation of a multi-ethnic Kosovo is doomed to be unsuccessful.  
However, it should also be taken into consideration that Serbian politicians are trying 
their best to damage the formation of a multi-cultural Kosovo. Their position will be 
analyzed in the subsequent subsection about parallel structures. 
 
European Stability Initiative prepared a report in 2004 about the Lausanne Principle, 
which discusses the applicability of Lausanne Principle about exchanging populations 
to the Serbian minority in Kosovo. According to this report, the credibility of NATO, 
UN, and EU are at stake because of the possibility of state formation with further 
ethnic cleansing. Any attempt to transfer populations will trigger more unrest. Hence, 
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without the solid base for multi-ethnic Kosovo, any solution which is in accordance 
with Lausanne Principle will bring more hatred, violence. Also, Lausanne Principle 
and EU objective to create multi-ethnic Kosovo is incompatible with each other. 
 
 
5.2.4. Decentralization 
 
One of the conditions of Ahtisaari plan is decentralization in the municipalities in 
particular for the Northern Mitrovica. On the other hand, according to the report of 
International Crisis Group, Ahtisaari plan makes the continuation of Belgrade’s 
influence on Serbian minority. (International Crisis Group Report No.177, November 
2006). Likewise, Judah (2006: 216) emphasizes the content of decentralization is the 
autonomy for Serbs, and Serbian minority would like to have the control of Belgrade 
instead of Prishtina.  
 
The decentralization plan is in parallel with Serbian wishes, Serbs wanted to form 
autonomous Serb enclaves because their main aim is the partition of Kosovo. 
European Stability Initiative report (2004: 25) uses Kostunica’s statements: “no 
matter what we call it-decentralization, cantonization, it makes no difference, some 
kind of autonomy must be given to the Serbs.” This statement summarizes Serbian 
plans about the future of Kosovo. This report (2004: 11) suggests that creation of 
autonomous Serb enclaves within Kosovo to preserve Serbian minority would cause 
Belgrade’s direct control in the region. However, this option is full of traps. First of 
all, separate Serb enclaves need extra land for farmers who are displaced. Direct 
consequence of such development is to take Albanians out, or persuade them to leave. 
 79
Secondly, by making Albanians leave the enclave, Serbs will no longer worry about 
their security, and survival in Kosovo. The ESI Report (2004: 13) points out the 
matters about maintenance of security given the division of Kosovo: 
 
In a divided Kosovo, Serb police could not monitor the activities of 
Albanian extremists, nor carry out arrests in the ‘Albanian’ territories 
they are based. Conversely, a purely Albanian Kosovo Police Service 
would be unable to investigate a crime scene within the Serb enclaves. It 
is natural that Kosovo Serbs expected to be served by Serb police 
officers within a multiethnic force. But if Kosovo is divided into two 
separate legal jurisdictions, effective policing of inter-ethnic crime 
becomes impossible. 
 
Thirdly, Serbian enclaves will rely on assistance from Kosovo budget, and this may 
make Serbian minority areas vulnerable. Since Kosovar Albanian politicians may not 
want to transfer revenues from Kosovo budget to fulfill the needs of Serbian enclaves, 
which may be annexed by Serbia proper in medium term. 
 
Another important point is to grasp the distinction between what EU understands from 
decentralization and what Serbs figure out. Actually, on the basis of Serbian 
perspective decentralization is a stepping stone to the partition of Kosovo. Ensuring 
security of Serbian minority is the pretext for Serbia proper. In order to undermine 
Kosovo’s sovereignty, and to disrupt the emergence of a sense of belonging to the 
Kosovo state among the Serbian minority, Serbian politicians continue to support 
parallel structures. However, EU wants decentralization for the sake of preserving 
multiethnic Kosovo. EU is aware of the fact that if every aspect of decentralization is 
evaluated well, and is kept under control, then both stability and security would be 
guaranteed. In addition, well-managed decentralization can stop Serbian desires of 
partitioning Kosovo. Therefore, EU must explicitly reject the partition and spoil 
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Belgrade’s tactic, but EU should persuade Kosovo government to take necessary steps 
so that Kosovo Serbian minority could be integrated into Kosovo.  
 
 
5.2.5. Partition of Kosovo 
 
Altmann (2001: 29) summarizes the basic tenets of partition. Partition is completely 
rejected by the Albanian side, but Serbs want to materialize this goal. River Ibar will 
be the frontier which divides Kosovo as northern and southern part, north Ibar will be 
unified with Serbia proper. Kosovo Albanians in the northern part will migrate to 
Kosovo, at the same time Serbs in the southern Ibar will face the hard choice of stay 
their home land, or migrate to Serbia. Therefore, exchange of population and territory 
will be against the commitment of EU on avoiding forced migration and creation of 
ethnically homogenous states in the Balkan scale.  
 
Partition of Kosovo will weaken Kosovo’s economy, and will not fix instability, 
security. Even if, Serbs have taken Northern part, it is noted that most of the important 
Serbian monasteries are in the southern part. This is a serious matter that should be 
taken into account. Furthermore, northern Kosovo had important mineral resources 
like Trepca mines and Kosovo can not be a viable state if partition occurs. Economic 
problems could generate more organized crime, unemployment. This could cause 
extremists to take power and manipulate the public easily; a suitable atmosphere for 
renewal of violence will take place. Shortly, divided Kosovo will bring more 
problems than it had solved. Thus, partition of Kosovo deprives it from the crucial 
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economic assets and it is a threat to the stability, violence, security of the Southeastern 
Europe.  
 
Partition will cause other problems for Serbian minorities and will not solve the issue 
of insecurity as the Serb population is dispersed; as a result they are still in need of 
protection. Batt (2005: 44) indicates that ethnic partition will make remaining Serbs in 
Kosovo more susceptible, due to the idea of ethnic partition legitimizing what is left 
from Kosovo is Albanian’s. Hence, Kosovar Albanians may resort to violence to erase 
the last pocket of Serbian minority that disturbs a homogenous Kosovo.  
 
There are three types of partition scenarios which are called as soft partition, violent 
partition and de facto partition. Toschev and Cheikhameguyaz (2005: 291) refer to the 
version of decentralization as soft partition where Serbs enclaves are de facto under 
the jurisdiction of Serbia proper. I have already discussed the traps of this scenario in 
the previous subsection, but its benefits should be reckoned. For the above mentioned 
authors, soft partition has the approval of Serbian minority and Serbia proper; 
therefore it is legitimate in the eyes of Serbs. Second implication of soft partition is 
the borders of Kosovo would remain integral. Tziampiris (2005: 286-287) discusses 
about the possibility of renewal of ethnic hostilities in Kosovo would trigger Serbia’s 
military response. After such a development, it is highly likely that there will be 
violent partition. This may trigger partition in adjacent territories in the form of 
forceful redrawing of borders in Republic Srpska, western Macedonia, and southern 
Serbia (Presevo valley). I will analyze the implications of partition of Kosovo in detail 
under the subheading forceful redrawing of borders. De facto partition is possible 
when Kosovo declares unilateral independence without the consent of international 
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community and the Serbs. Kosovo Serbs may declare secession from Kosovo and 
demand outright unification with Serbia proper. In line with the option of de facto 
partition, an expert on the Balkans had made a comment in International Herald 
Tribune on 18th of February 2008, she argues that no matter what comes out of 
Kosovo’s independence, and de facto partition is on the horizon, despite the 
unwillingness to accept it.  
 
 
5.2.6. Parallel structures and Serbian minority boycotting elections in Kosovo 
 
The inheritance of setting up parallel structures of Kosovar Albanians is now an 
obstacle for Kosovo while building functional statehood. Furthermore, the same 
method is used by the Serbian minority in order not to recognize authority of 
Prishtina. Judah (2001: 62) puts an emphasis on the negative consequences of lack of 
institutions in Kosovo, the intensification of chaos, and he predicts that under these 
circumstances, Kosovo could become “NATO’s West Bank.” According to EU 
Commission Staff Working Document (2006: 9), two systems run in Kosovo in public 
administration like justice, education, health care simultaneously. The most important 
issues are the property registration, recognition of diplomas, identity cards. Since, 
unrecognized property registration creates legal uncertainty for property holders. 
Moreover, diplomas and passports which are considered to be invalid, limit the free 
movement of people, access to education and work. Hence, parallel structures should 
be tackled during the EU supervision, otherwise they are a direct threat to Kosovo’s 
sovereignty, and prepares ground for Kosovo to become a weak state, and prevents a 
coherent society from taking root in the state.  
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 Parallel structures set by the Serbian minority are also instrumental for the Serbs to 
have the upper hand in negotiations due to the partition scenario. On the basis of this 
version, Batt (2005: 46) reflects the following argument; provided that Serbia gets all 
the territory that is under the control of Serbian minority, and parallel structures run 
by Serbs around that area, this piece of land will be equal to the one quarter of 
Kosovo. Being dominated and alienated by the Albanian policies, Serbian minority 
opposes strongly to the independence of Kosovo. This makes Serbian minority more 
to seek the support of Serbia proper and to be manipulated by Serbian politicians 
easier. By this way, Kosovo Serbs can not develop healthy ties with Kosovo 
government, and can not feel loyal to the newly emerged state.  
Boycotting the elections in Kosovo is a method that Serbian minority utilizes to 
reinforce its relationship with Serbia proper. Serbian minority once did not boycott 
the parliamentary elections and joined the process, despite the fact that they are not in 
favor of an independent Kosovo. By joining the elections, Serbian minority hoped that 
its voice will be heard in the final status decisions. For instance, before the March 
2004 unrests, there were 22 seats for Kosovo Serbs. However, March 2004 events had 
negatively influenced the participation level of Kosovo Serbs in elections. In line with 
this argument, Pond (2005: 30-31) highlights that Kosovo Serbs rejected to take part 
in elections and they preferred the continuation of parallel structures run by Belgrade, 
although they are modest. The modification of Kosovar Albanian leaders’ attitude 
towards Serbian minority, given that it is genuine, may contribute to the inclusion of 
Serbs and despite its difficulty may cause Serbian minority to develop a sense of 
belonging to Kosovo state. On the other hand, realization of this objective is not so 
simple, and is not very likely to happen. The differences between Kosovar Albanians 
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and Serbs are increasing day by day, and every step with goodwill may cause further 
discontent as it might be too late to create a multiethnic Kosovo and integrating Serbs 
and Albanians. 
 
 
5.2.7. Redrawing Borders, Destabilizing the Balkans  
 
Redrawing borders by force, particularly in the Balkan context is problematic as it 
will trigger further disintegration by encouraging secessionist movements. The impact 
of Kosovo issue on the modification of borders will either be via partition, or 
escalation of an armed conflict among Serbia and Kosovo. As a consequence, 
territorial integrity of the following states is at stake: Macedonia, Bosnia, Serbia, and 
Kosovo. Hasani (1998: 54) stresses that the application of self-determination principle 
and redrawing borders in Former Yugoslavia did not take border adjustments into 
account beforehand, and “left people on the wrong side of the border and made them 
vulnerable to ethnic cleansing.” Also, Hasani refers to the distinction between the 
lands created by the use of force and ethnically cleansing the areas (Republica Srpska) 
versus the entities existed long time ago (case of Kosovo). The author (:54) points out 
that by neglecting the discussion on border adjustments those two cases are treated by 
international community as equal. I agree with the distinction that Hasani underlines, 
especially the case of Kosovo and Republica Srpska due to the risk of partition and its 
destabilizing results for the entire region. However, I do not think that further 
modification of borders after independence of Kosovo is necessary and desirable. 
Change of borders by use of force and ethnic cleansing should be prevented by 
conflict prevention methods used by NATO, EU. Secessionist claims of Albanians in 
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Presovo Valley and Macedonia to form greater Kosovo, Republica Srpska’s desire to 
secede from Bosnia and unify with Serbia proper, partition of Kosovo among Serbs 
and Albanians should be managed by conflict prevention methods used by NATO, 
EU. Kosovo’s independence was like opening Pandora’s Box, it will cause new 
conflicts. The statement of Tadic needs to be mentioned in the context of the danger 
of instability due to the future developments in Kosovo issue. “Should Serbia be 
partitioned against its will…it could in turn result in the escalation of many existing 
conflicts, the reactivation of a number of frozen conflicts, and the instigation of who 
knows how many new conflicts.”(Speech during the opening of security conference, 
Munich, 8 February 2008, BBC News). To what extent EU and NATO can cope with 
the risks arising from Kosovo’s independence mainly avoidance of violent conflict 
and keep Kosovo intact simultaneously is the main question. I will deal with the 
modification of borders by use of force, in the milieu of greater Kosovo/greater 
Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia briefly within the framework of the deterioration 
of status quo in Kosovo issue.  
 
 
5.2.7.1. Greater Albania and Greater Kosovo 
 
Although Ahtisaari plan had prohibited Kosovo’s unification with other states, there is 
still the risk of establishing Greater Albania and/or Greater Kosovo. Batt (2005: 51) 
refers to report 161 of International Crisis Group which underlines that it is 
widespread among Kosovar Albanian politicians to merge with Albania in the future 
on the basis of a federation. Batt (2005: 51) discusses that the rise of Albanian 
nationalism is a real concern for the Serbs given that it is uncontrolled. If Kosovo 
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unites with Albania proper or other Albanian living territories, then the territorial 
integrity of Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia will be disrupted. Moreover, the 
realization of Greater Kosovo/Greater Albania might create similar demands by 
Hungarians in Transylvania and Vojvodina, Croats in Bosnia, Republica Srpska in 
Bosnia, thus it will encourage secessionist movements in Europe. Furthermore, Dassu 
(2001: 38) states that EU anchoring perspective for the South Eastern Europe does not 
create the unstable environment that Greater Albania project could flourish. Likewise, 
this is the case for Greater Kosovo. However, as soon as EU anchoring becomes 
ineffective, then Greater Albania / Kosovo might find the fertile ground to come true. 
Consequently, the desire to set up either Greater Albania or Greater Kosovo is up to 
the fate of EU anchoring. 
 
As I have previously stated, it is not Kosovo’s independence that will cause insecurity 
in the region, but it is the possibility of modification of borders and further 
disintegration in the form of Greater Kosovo/Greater Albania. In line with the 
possibility of ultimate merger with Albania, Batt (2008: 5) highlights the perception 
of Kosovo’s independence as one step forward in order to achieve Greater Albania 
project. Likewise, Altmann (2001: 31) specifies the probability of unification of 
Albania and Kosovo under a federation is very high and a greater Albanian state 
would damage the existing balance in the region. For Altmann, the merger of Kosovo 
and Albania would not finish the Greater Albanian project, but it would trigger the 
secessionist attempts in the Albanian inhabited territories such as southern 
Macedonia, Presevo Valley, Montenegro instead. Heisbourg (2005: 1) uses the 
argument of Shemelov, which equalizes independence of Kosovo with the realization 
of Greater Albania, which may result in clash of civilizations in the region. Shemelov 
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makes an emphasis on the risk of a potential armed conflict between Serbia proper 
and a new Greater Albania may cause a new war in the region. I will deal with the 
Greater Kosovo project in the following subsection which outlines the disruption of 
Macedonia’s territorial integrity. 
 
 
5.2.7.2. Disruption of Macedonia’s Territorial Integrity 
 
During the crisis of 2001 in Macedonia, the Macedonian government claimed that its 
stability is under threat due to the KLA insurgents. According to the Macedonian 
point of view, Albanians are trying to make use of the uncertain climate in Kosovo 
and want to redraw the borders in their favor. Despite the fact that KLA had made it 
clear that it had no intention to fragment Macedonia, it still insists on equal treatment 
to Albanian minority in Macedonia on the constitution. Within the EU brokered Ohrid 
framework, positive developments had taken place so far. Nevertheless, Macedonia 
still continues to be in the equation of nightmare scenarios on Kosovo issue. 
Macedonia is fragile, and its territorial integrity is at stake especially due to the 
possibility of partition of Kosovo and its reflection on Macedonia. In other words, 
Macedonia can take problems from Kosovo in the outline of organized crime, 
secessionist activities. Macedonians and Albanian minority in Macedonia are both 
discontent with the current status quo that was built under Ohrid accords. 
Macedonians do not want to apply the measures that give Albanian minority equal 
status. If Ohrid accords are not implemented fully, then how can Albanian minority 
feel that its status is not second class in the country? Hence, the prospect of secession 
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and unification with Kosovo will be a better alternative for the Albanian minority, and 
this will obviously damage the stability of Macedonia.  
 
Ragaru (2008: 54) emphasizes the link between Macedonians concerns of an 
uncontrolled independence of Kosovo and its spillover effects for Macedonia. For 
ethnic Macedonians, Albanian inhabited places, especially Tetovo region which is 
closer to Kosovo, may secede and merge with Kosovo, and Greater Kosovo could be 
achieved and this is a nightmare for Macedonians. Also, provided that KLA is not 
satisfied with the status of Albanian minority in Macedonia and decides to stir up the 
ethnic tensions, it will be likely that ethnic Macedonians worries will come true as a 
self fulfilling prophecy. Bumci (1999: 62) underlines the presence of a security 
relationship among Kosovo and Macedonia. For him, partition of Kosovo will be a 
bad precedent for Macedonia, and he concludes his argument by stating the risk of a 
war in Kosovo dragging Macedonia and damages its territorial integrity and vice 
versa. Similarly, Tziampiris (2005: 287) stresses that partition of Kosovo could be 
more destabilizing for Macedonia, given that it would cause further radicalization of 
Albanian minority and eruption of violence in the country. Also, Altmann (2001: 31) 
suggests that fragmentation of Macedonia would undermine the stability, security of 
neighboring states like Greece, Albania, Kosovo, Serbia and Bulgaria. To put it 
briefly, deterioration of status quo either in the scenarios of Greater Kosovo, or the 
partition of Kosovo, directly affects Macedonian territorial integrity, fragile ethnic 
balance that is achieved with great difficulty. As a result of this, disintegration of 
Macedonia would more likely weaken the dream of prosperity, stability and security 
in the Southeastern Europe and turn it into a nightmare instead. 
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5.2.7.3. Interruption of Territorial Integrity of Serbia due to a possible secession 
in Presevo Valley 
 
Eldridge (2001: 37) states that from 1999 to 2001, KLA started to be involved in 
violent activities in southeast Serbia, which is Presevo Valley. According to the 
author, the chief plan of KLA by attacking Serbian military and police was to provoke 
a Serbian anger, trigger a new armed conflict and preserve their political say on the 
future of Kosovo. In accordance with this argument, one can infer that further 
radicalization in Kosovar Albanians, in particular among the discontent youth, would 
cause problems in Presevo valley as well. Therefore, Serbia should be extremely 
cautious while dealing with the problems in Presevo valley in order not to provoke a 
new conflict that bares the danger to become a war. Batt (2008: 8) designates the fact 
that some Albanian leaders in Presevo valley preferred to use Eastern Kosovo with a 
political motivation behind. The demand of secession from Serbia and subsequently 
unification with Kosovo is their main objective. Moreover, the places where Albanian 
minority lives in Serbia is poor, undeveloped. The author reveals that unemployment 
rate is seventy percent among Albanian minority in the district. Despite the fact that 
Serbian governments tried to improve the conditions of living in Presevo valley, the 
existing problems remained unsolved. Hence, under these circumstances Albanians in 
Presevo valley can be more open to take part in KLA activities, and actively seek 
secession and form Greater Kosovo. If such a worse case scenario occurs, the military 
operations of Serbian army will not be a surprise either, and this will mean another 
cycle of war among Kosovo and Serbia that may drag the neighbors inside of the 
conflict, and this is the nightmare itself. 
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Yannis (2001: 31) has pointed out that Serbs and Kosovar Albanians will be more 
likely to resort to other ways in order to win the game of enhancing their vital 
interests:                  
 
Not only was the conflict continuing, but both sides were prepared to 
advance their  struggle by other means, as illustrated, among others, by 
the emergence of violent division of Mitrovica and its “sister crisis” in 
Presevo in Southern Serbia (or  Eastern  Kosovo as Kosovo Albanians 
prefer to call the area). 
 
 
In parallel with the argument of Yannis, if Serbia tries to obstruct Kosovo from 
achieving stability, because it may find itself tackling with an ethnic turmoil in 
Presevo. Likewise, Tziampiris (2005: 290) indicates that the attempt to give 
substantial autonomy based on ethnic lines could easily damage the territorial 
integrity of Serbia due to the presence of minorities in Vojvodina, and Presevo. Thus, 
Serbia can play with the matches, start the flames, and burn Kosovo’s stability, but 
can not stay out of the fire and will damage itself as well. 
 
A well known expert,  Daniel Serwer thinks that Kosovo Albanians will not choose 
secession of Presevo from Serbia, provided that Serbs refrain doing the same thing 
about Mitrovica in immediate time frame (Council on Foreign Relations, 
Independence for Kosovo? Managing the Consequences: 4). But to what extent one 
can rely on the sustainability of such an assumption, since both sides have high level 
of distrust, and without constructing a state of normalcy among the parties, there is the 
danger of each side’s resort to support and accelerate the secessionist attempts. In 
other words, the assumption of Serwer is flaw within the context of unpredictable 
patterns in Kosovar Albanians and Serbians interactions, and the need of caution to 
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foreshadow a future conflict and take essential measures accordingly. As a reliable 
prediction can not be obtained about the future of Kosovo and Serbia domestic 
politics, given the lack of a guarantee of the rise of radical and discontent group’s 
pressure. 
 
Tziampiris (2005: 288) signifies that partition of Kosovo could cause the demand of 
Albanian minority in accordance with the same kind of healing to Kosovo Serbs. The 
author refers to the view of a Presevo Albanian politician that is cited in Churcher: 
“Albanians of Presevo valley will ask nothing more than what Serbs of northern 
Kosovo are asking.” Therefore, while using Mitrovica as leverage for Kosovo, Serbia 
should pay attention to its borders to overcome the instability, insecurity that is a 
threat to both itself, and to the wider region. Balcer et al (2008: 72) indicates that 
another region that will be a source of tension is Sandzak, which is shared between 
Serbia and Montenegro. The area is widely populated by Bosniaks who are poor, 
conservative and open to Islamic fundamentalism. In addition, there is a pro-Albanian 
sympathy in Sandzak; so the dynamics in the region should be managed care-fully in 
order to avoid an ethnic turmoil.  
 
 
5.2.7.4. Disturbance of Territorial Integrity of Bosnia due to a possible secession 
of Republica Srpska 
 
Partition of Kosovo would have various complications for the states in the region, 
although the most vulnerable state which is directly under the pressure of 
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fragmentation is in fact Bosnia Herzegovina.6 Altmann (2001: 31) points out how 
Bosnia would be divided into three distinct parts on the basis of Kosovo’s 
independence as a bad precedent: 
 
The recognition of an independent Kosovo after a successful referendum 
could not only serve as a precedent for Albanian population in 
Macedonia and Montenegro, and maybe even also in northern Greece, 
but even more for the Bosnian Serbs in   Republica Srpska. They could 
be tempted to follow the example of Kosovo and launch a referendum 
on unification with Serbia proper, in contravention of the   Dayton 
accords. Similarly, the Croats of Herzegovina could then insist on a 
referendum for the unification with Croatia, leaving behind a rump 
Bosnia deprived of two-thirds of its present territory.  
 
The argument of Altmann was formed in 2001, that moment Kosovo’s conditional 
independence has not been materialized, and since that time it was evident that Serbs 
will demand to unite with Republica Srpska as a compensation of the loss of Kosovo. 
After seven years, Serbian strategy remained the same; this is visible in the statements 
of the leaders of Republica Srpska. For instance, they threatened to disrupt Bosnia’s 
territorial integrity by seceding from Bosnia and declare outright unification with 
Serbia proper if and when Kosovo’s independence is recognized. Argument of 
Altmann is in some ways flaw, because he forms his argument on the basis of the 
problematic assumption. While Altmann states that Kosovo’s independence will be a 
precedent for other entities such as Republica Srpska in the region, he does not make 
the distinction between the ways of creation of entities in Kosovo and Republica 
Srpska. Sejdiu (2005: 90-91) underlines this point, he based his claims on the 
                                                 
6With the Dayton Accords of 1995, Bosnia Herzegovina Federation was established. Higher 
representative is the centre of power who can annul laws, enact legislation, dismiss officials. So far, a 
convertible currency, licence plate, flag is introduced. The way that Bosnia is democratized is open to 
criticim since there is democratization via dictatorship, for instance Professor Neuhold discusses this 
point. Dayton accords had dealt with the constitut-ion of Bosnia Herzegovina. Bosnia Herzegovina is 
one state, which is composed of Republica Srpska, and Croat-Bosnian Federation. Croat Bosnian 
Federation has ten cantons. The state does not have a single army, but three distinct armies instead. 
Given the corruption, and the remains of ethnic cleansing Bosnia’s Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs will 
vote for nationalist politicians. Stabilization and Association Process can be the only viable solution to 
keep Bosnia-Herzegovina intact. 
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premises of “Kosovo having a different culture, history, nation and identity which is 
recognized in the constitution of Former Yugoslavia.” and for him, “Republica Srpska 
as an entity is the product of Serbian genocidal campaign against Bosnian Muslims 
and it has no historical or cultural identity.” Moreover, Sejdiu indicates that should 
Republica Srpska become an independent state, this will mean that Serbian strategy to 
increase its territory by ethnic cleansing is acceptable for the international community. 
On the basis of the premises of Sejdiu, the part of the Altmann’s argument which sets 
up an artificial link between Kosovo’s independence and its being a precedent for 
Republica Srpska is refuted as they do not share the same conditions. However every 
point of the argument of Altmann is not invalid; as there is an association among how 
Kosovo issue will be handled and the territorial integrity of Bosnia. In some ways, 
Altmann’s argument can be reformulated and be valid under recent circumstances. It 
is not the Kosovo’s independence that poses a risk to the territorial integrity of 
Bosnia, but it is the partition of the state. Likewise Tziampiris signifies the redrawing 
of borders would open Dayton accord’s legitimacy to discussion. In line with the 
complications of partition of Kosovo, Tziampiris states that if partition of Kosovo 
occurs, then it will be a precedent for the case of Republica Srpska. If Altmann’s 
argument is reformulated on the grounds of Kosovo’s partition would be a bad 
precedent for Bosnia’s territorial integrity due to the demands of Republica Srpska to 
secede and unify with Serbia proper, then it is an updated and valid argument.  
 
Balcer et al (2008: 70) states that Republica Srpska rejects the possibility of 
limitations on the level of its autonomy, “even if preserving it comes at the price of 
excluding Bosnia-Herzegovina from EU integration processes.” In parallel with the 
ongoing discussions in the country about the modernization of the political system 
 94
which will constrain substantial autonomy of Republica Srpska. As a result of this 
tension, Republica Srpska may end relations with the central authorities in Bosnia, 
and as I have mentioned previously, Republica Srpska threatened to withdraw from 
Bosnian federation given the Kosovo’s independence. Bugajski (2007: 6) raises the 
point of Republica Srpska to take a portion of land, Brcko, from Bosnia; the main 
significance of this land is to keep two Serbian parts together in order to ensure that 
the newly formed state is not divided. The author (: 6) reflects that “Bosnian Serbs 
may provoke a military operation of Sarajevo to justify Belgrade’s and Moscow’s 
assistance to maintain Serbs interests.”(Council on Foreign Relations, Independence 
for Kosovo? Managing the Consequences). Sven Alkalaj, who is the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Bosnia Herzegovina during an interview, acknowledges that 
despite the fact that Kosovo’s independence made the circumstances difficult for 
them; the problem is not that serious. For the minister of Foreign Affairs, if Republica 
Srpska declares independence on the grounds of Kosovo’s independence, this will 
mean their indirect recognition of Kosovo. He emphasizes Dayton accords which 
prohibits one constituent of Bosnia to secede without the will of the others. For him, 
the three components of Bosnia would not accept fragmentation at the same time, 
therefore Kosovo’s independence can have some destabilizing effects on Bosnia, with 
the caution and assistance of international community Bosnia’s territorial integrity 
could easily be preserved (Interview with Semih İdiz, Milliyet, 03-05-2008). While 
making projections of dooms day scenarios, it is not possible to rely on wishful 
thinking as it is observed in the statements of Alkalaj. If Bosnia’s territorial integrity 
is in the hands of international community, then to what extent one can rely on the 
genuineness of its commitment and support to keep Bosnia intact, as the previous 
hesitation of international community to intervene the wars of Yugoslav dissolution 
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demonstrates. Hence, the destabilization arising from the way that Kosovo issue is 
handled will have the potential to disrupt ethnic and political balance in Bosnia the 
most, and will continue to be on the centre of the dooms day scenarios. 
 
 
5.3. Serbia’s preferences as a state and effects of its choices on its foreign policy 
orientation 
 
Batt (2005: 11) designates the importance of Serbia being a “nation-state of the 
modern European type.” For the author, in order to be that kind of state, Serbia must 
have clear borders; without fulfilling that condition, Serbia will be a threat not only to 
its neighbors, but also to Serbia’s integration to Euro-Atlantic structures by being a 
liberal-democratic state. In other words, if Serbia chooses a non-liberal, extreme 
nationalist and hardliner stance, then it will follow an uncompromising, aggressive 
foreign policy and may even resort to use of force to resolve to take Kosovo back and 
disrupt territorial integrity of Bosnia. Furthermore, Sejdiu (2005: 81) emphasizes the 
fact that Serbian democratic transition has not finished yet, so the old matters like 
army and church as the sources of xenophobia and extreme nationalism are still there. 
Given that Serbians choose to have a hardliner government, this will make Serbia 
away from European Union membership perspective and cause Serbia’s isolation in 
the region. I will discuss the effects of Serbian domestic politics preferences on 
Serbia’s relations with its neighbors. 
 
Delevic (2007: 80) states that Serbia can not cause trouble to EU countries or US, but 
can be a threat to its neighbors, if these states recognize the independence of Kosovo. 
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For example, in order not to provoke Republica Srpska, Bosnia did not recognize 
Kosovo’s independence. On the other hand, Slovenia which is an EU member had 
recognized the state, and Croatia as an EU candidate followed the same route. The 
author makes affirms that if a NATO member state recognizes Kosovo, as a result 
Serbia’s relations with the organization may become sour. Bugajski (2007: 6-7) 
summarizes the possible efforts of Serbians to steer up tensions, in Montenegro and 
Macedonia. For him, tensions in Albanian inhabited parts of Macedonia may be 
encouraged by Serbian and Russian services to justify that there is a plot of a greater 
Albania. Besides, Serbia may threaten Montenegro not to recognize Kosovo, force 
recognition of Republica Srpska, and “radical Serb militias may seek to provoke the 
Albanian minority in Montenegro and use Montenegro to stage attacks into Kosovo.” 
Thus, how Montenegro can retain good relations with Kosovo and not inflame 
Serbia’s anger is the main dilemma. (Council on Foreign Relations, Independence for 
Kosovo? Managing the Consequences) 
 
Serbia can make life difficult for Kosovo without resorting to military operations. 
Serbia may close the border between two states, cut off electricity and energy supplies 
to Kosovo, forces de facto partition of Kosovo, deteriorates relations with states 
which recognized Kosovo. If Serbs dare to cut off their ties with EU and US, they will 
become isolated, and be eventually the pariahs of European continent. In addition, 
Serbia exposed to sanctions against countries that recognize Kosovo’s independence, 
but USA and EU will show the stick on the condition that Serbia becomes 
uncontrollable. A group of protestors attacked Turkish Embassy, US embassy and the 
mission of Slovenia in Belgrade after these state’s recognition of Kosovo. 
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5.4. The legitimacy issue and Kosovo’s risk of becoming a failed state 
 
Rakipi (2007: 6) outlines the connection between democracy, legitimacy, and weak 
states. He points out that without taking a state fall into the categories of multiethnic 
or nation states into account, the lack of functions of a state make the state weak. 
Besides, there is the trouble of lack of legitimacy that is the product of weak 
institutions, and unfinished democratic transition. Rakipi claims that weak / failed 
states are menaces to national and regional stability in the forms of the spillover of the 
conflict to other states, organized crime. The ongoing parallel structures of Serbian 
minority in Kosovo will make the legitimacy of Kosovo state questionable. Likewise 
Veremis (2001: 93) discusses the organized crime having fertile ground in the 
collapsed or failed states. For him, the examples of this kind of states are Albania, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, the Presevo valley, Kosovo and Bosnia. These places do not 
enjoy an enforcement of judiciary and rules; there is a lack of democratic institutions 
as well, so that organized crime can exploit every opportunity. These failed states 
nourish irredentist agenda and pursue revisionist tendencies. Lastly, if European 
Union does not construct democratic institutions in Kosovo during the conditional 
independence period, then Kosovo will be doomed to be a failed state which is a 
threat to its neighbors and to wider European stability.  
 
 
5.5. Arguments related to eruption of violence in Kosovo 
 
Arguments which are related to the renewal of violence to resolve Kosovo issue are 
affected by various factors such as; reinforced position of KLA, massive expulsion of 
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Serbian minority from Kosovo, the presence and the risk of use of arms in the region, 
the risk of Serbs to use force to take Kosovo back, and the Radicals gaining upper 
hand in Serbian political arena. I will deal with these factors separately. 
 
 
5.5.1. Reinforced position of KLA 
 
Given that conditional independence will take longer than expected, that is the 
transition period to a full-fledged independent Kosovo is not on the medium term 
horizon, in addition to the ongoing frustration and economic problems in the state is 
not resolved, then it is expected that extreme nationalists may become stronger. 
According to the European Stability Initiative Report on Lausanne Principle and the 
Future of Kosovo Serbs, that is issued in June 2004, extremists had used to show that 
they are strong by exploiting the frustration among the Kosovar Albanians with the 
international administration and its instruments, they used violence for political ends, 
so the threat of recurrence of such events is still there. (ESI Report, 2004: 23) 
 
 As EU is the monitoring body of conditional independence and Kosovo government 
wants to be an EU member later, Kosovar Albanians may not perceive EU as an 
enemy in short run, but in the medium and long term, and if EU acts as a neo-colonial 
force in the eyes of Kosovar Albanians public opinion, subsequently attacks against 
EU presence will occur. This prediction is in line with the March 2004 unrests, there 
had been attacks to KFOR by Kosovar Albanians, on the basis of this situation, and 
one may anticipate that EULEX may face the same kind of treatment after an 
extensive presence in Kosovo. It is highly likely that treatment of minorities will be 
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testing ground for the EU mission in Kosovo and Kosovo government, and there will 
be tensions among the two bodies due to this topic. For instance, it is expected that 
concessions given to Serbian minority over internal issues will cause dissatisfaction 
among some Kosovar Albanians. Hence, the more radicalization in Kosovo, and 
reinforced position of KLA due to economic problems and discontent with EULEX 
mission, the riskier of an eruption of violence towards minorities in Kosovo which 
may result in forceful expulsion of Serbian minority.  
 
 
5.5.2. Massive expulsion of Serbian minority from Kosovo 
 
Allin (2001: 9) puts an emphasis on the acts of Albanians in Kosovo are acts of 
revenge, and there was the logic of ethnic cleansing as well in their minds. The author 
states that the reversal of ethnic cleansing decreased the sympathy of the West which 
Kosovar Albanians enjoyed. Altmann (2001: 31) suggests that the lack of conditional 
independence especially to protect the minorities, there is the possibility of “constant 
discrimination and even a deliberate or forced exodus of these minorities.” March 
2004 unrests might be considered as a rehearsal of massive expulsion of minorities in 
this regard, and a massive expulsion of Serbian minority will be the pretext for Serbs 
use of force to take Kosovo back.  Another issue that will be a source of tension is the 
refugee return. Balcer (unknown date: 48) indicates that in order to make refugee 
return attractive, West should prepare the financial grounds. But refugees may not be 
interested in return given the danger of massive expulsion. Thus, the results of 
massive expulsion is a real threat to the stability of Kosovo, region, and may cause 
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endless Western military presence to prevent armed conflicts between Serbia and 
Kosovo. 
 
 
5.5.3. Existence of Huge stockpile of arms in the region 
 
FRIDE Democracy Backgrounders report on May 2007 refers to a study on light 
arms, which is conducted by South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons and published in June 2006. This study shows that 
there were 400.000 weapons in Kosovo. Vickers (2008: 24) points out that “until a 
durable settlement is reached for Kosovo issue, the security of Albania proper is at 
stake because of the danger of arms might be stock-piled in Albania.” Paramilitaries 
on both sides have the access to these stockpiles of light weapons and will be more 
likely to use them, unless the arms trafficking are controlled properly by NATO 
troops in the region.  
 
 
5.5.4. Serbs option to take Kosovo back by force 
 
International Crisis Group Report no.161 (2005: 1) suggests that if Kosovar Albanians 
resort to violence and try to suppress the Serbian minority, as a result Kosovo Serbs 
may demand the help of Serbian army, and there will be another crisis. On the basis of 
this argument, Judah (2006: 216) underlines the Serbian point which is due to the loss 
of Kosovo, Serbia has the right to take it back in the future. He refers to the remarks 
of Alexander Simic, one of the key advisors to Kostunica: “The Albanians have to be 
 101
aware that they will not receive independence and Serbia will have the right to take 
back everything it lost in an illegal manner.” Even though Tadic assures that Serbs 
will not use force to take Kosovo back, with a change in the leadership of Serbia, a 
hardliner leader may declare war to Kosovo. Thus, NATO forces could be in the 
middle and be dragged into a new armed conflict between Serbs and Kosovar 
Albanians. 
 
  
5.5.5. Radicals gaining influence in Serbia and Serbian vengeance due to the loss 
of Kosovo 
 
Allin (2001: 13) stresses that “without NATO presence in Kosovo, Serb revanchism 
and Albanian extremism could produce another war.” Economic and social 
discontents are threats to stability, and could cause more nationalistic movements to 
come to power both in Kosovo and Serbia. Therefore, if the sources of tension which 
are economic, social and psychological are not eliminated, escalation of armed 
conflict among Kosovo and Serbia is foreseeable. In the psychological realm, Winther 
(2007: 82) suggests that the constant reference to revenge and retaliation is found both 
among Serbs and Kosovar Albanians so that forgiveness and forgetfulness could not 
take place. The imminent danger of reprisals towards Serbian minority which is due to 
the vengeance of Kosovar Albanians is linked to the past traumas that have not been 
relieved yet. Under these circumstances, the distrust between the two communities 
continues, and there is no progress in relation to reconciliation. A divided Kosovo is a 
real obstacle because of the constant reminder of the objective of a multiethnic 
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Kosovo is unrealistic and post traumatic society can not settle, as the memories of 
ethnic cleansing, revenge are still alive.  
 
 
5.6. International actors’ role in the decline of Kosovo 
 
European Union, USA, and Russia are the main actors in the Kosovo issue; so their 
relations with each other within the context of Kosovo issue will be examined briefly, 
as a detailed analysis will be too ambitious, and it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
European Union and USA share the same perspective which is conditional 
independence of Kosovo, while the minority rights will be granted in full terms. Both 
are against the partition option; however there will be disagreements between EU and 
USA due to the possibility of a long military engagement requirement in Kosovo. If 
the exit strategy for Kosovo is not form-ed in advance, and the EU member states 
which have not recognized Kosovo continue to follow the same policy, there will be 
important difference of opinions. Furthermore, Van Meurs (2008: 9) stresses that 
there will be hard choices among the EU and USA because of the timing factor:  
For Washington it is about acting quickly enough not to forego the 
current momentum in the Kosovo issue, but not to loose its European 
allies by going too fast. For Brussels there is a fine line between pushing 
the disinclined member states too hard and risking another 
demonstration of European disunity- a disservice to the EU, to Kosovo 
and to transatlantic relations.  
 
Moreover, integrating Kosovo and the Western Balkans in the Euro-Atlantic 
structures is the common vision of EU and US. Unless EU keeps offering membership 
perspective to Western Balkan states, there will be huge disappointment for those 
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states and as a consequence, due to the failure of the common vision there will be 
problems between EU and US. Van Meurs (2008: 9) indicates that Russian strategy of 
creating intra-EU or transatlantic discord back-fired. Even though, any crack on the 
Western alliance is useful for Russian interests in Europe and global level so far this 
is not materialized. It is obvious that integration of Western Balkan states to Euro-
Atlantic structures is against Russian’s interests, Balcer et al (2008: 73) states that 
Russia tries to obstruct Western vision for the region by insisting on its 
uncompromising stance in Kosovo issue for the sake of maintaining Serbia intact as a 
pretext. 
 
Balcer et al (2008: 47) signifies that the Russian position on the Kosovo issue is “an 
opportunity to international scene as an actor without whose approval no major 
international problem may be solved.” According to the authors, Russia’s main aim is 
to gain concession from Western world which are significant Russian interests, 
including deployment of US missiles in Europe, and recognition of CIS are Russian 
spheres of influence. Russian strategy is to use the recognition of South Ossetia, 
Transdienster and Abkhazia as leverage. Russian’s attitude towards Kosovo issue is 
ambivalent as well in the sense of the change of borders it is dangerous for 
international order, but Kosovo as a precedent serves Russian interests in the 
recognition of above mentioned entities independence.  
 
If an escalation of a military conflict takes place among Serbs and Albanians (whose 
religion is to great extent Islam), it will be perceived as a conflict between Muslims 
and Christians, which may be analyzed within the framework of the argument of clash 
of civilizations. Hence, Islamic extremists from the Middle East might be engaged in 
 104
the conflict within the framework of Islamic brotherhood. On the other hand, that kind 
of a scenario would be a nightmare of USA, since the presence of Islamic 
fundamentalists in Kosovo and their growing influence in the region is a threat to the 
Euro-Atlantic vision in the Western Balkans, it is a destabilizing factor for the region 
as Islamic fundamentalists way of life and the values of Western model did not 
converge. 
 
USA has a military base in Kosovo, and it may use this military presence to deter a 
rise of Russian influence in the region. Simultaneously, there are rumors of Russian 
deployment of missiles on the coastline of Drina River on Serbia. On the basis of this 
situation, there will be a shift in the balance of power in the Balkans and USA 
military presence may not be considered as adequate, so it will be raised. Besides, the 
support that USA offers Albanians may cause alienation of Macedonia, Greece, 
Serbia; therefore these states may pursue more pro-Russian policies. This will be 
another incompatible point with respect to USA strategy in the region and may cause 
weakening of EU anchoring for the Western Balkans indirectly. In other words, 
Balcer et al (2008: 78) designates that given the substantial deterioration of 
interactions among Serbia and West, “Serbia would become an island in the middle of 
the Balkans, impeding further enlargement of the EU, and drifting towards Russia.” 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The finest scenario for the stability of the Western Balkans, and the West is the 
acceptance of Kosovo’s independence by Serbia without any further modification of 
borders in Europe. This scenario includes Russia’s approval of Kosovo’s 
independence in the Security Council so that Kosovo could become a member of 
international community, but this may not be realized prior to the termination of the 
feud between the Albanians and Serbs. Conditional independence of Kosovo under 
EU supervision is the most suitable time to resolve these disputes among the Serbs 
and Kosovar Albanians. Within the transition period towards full scale independence, 
the necessary institutions in Kosovo for a sustainable economy, liberal democracy, 
and preservation of minority rights should be established; so Kosovar citizens 
regardless of ethnic background could internalize above mentioned values. At this 
point, Galtung’s classification of peace as negative and positive should be taken into 
consideration. Negative peace is the absence of war, but the root causes of violence 
which can be structural / indirect, personal / direct have not been eliminated, and are 
still apparent. Positive peace is the absence of structural violence in socioeconomic 
field and makes persons realize their full potential on global level. On the basis of this 
distinction, EU should continue to work on projects to build positive peace among 
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Serbs and Kosovar Albanians bearing in mind that this would be a long, expensive 
process and needs expertise, so that EU should take essential measures accordingly.  
 
It is highly likely that Serbian ambivalence will continue, due to the requirement of 
making a decision between digesting the loss of Kosovo and integrating to Euro-
Atlantic frameworks on the one hand, and insisting on taking Kosovo back some time 
later in the expense of isolation, and disintegration on the other hand. Likewise, 
Kosovar Albanians treatment to minorities, and the lessons from conditional 
independence process will be of decisive importance in the edge of Kosovo’s 
integration of EU and NATO. Moreover, European Union must decide on its future 
with respect to the scope of the enlargement in the South Eastern Europe. The only 
thing that can make the loss of Kosovo tolerable for Serbia is the horizon of EU 
membership. Under these conditions, the ambivalence of EU is a real danger for 
stability in the region, because South Eastern European states will be derailed from 
“EU anchoring” and therefore Russian influence in the region may increase and EU 
will lose its credibility. If European Union fails in the conditional independence 
process of Kosovo, then it will not only disappoint USA which has complaints about 
burden sharing, but also show that European Union is still incapable of dealing with 
the conflicts in its own backyard. Hence, the way that Kosovo issue is managed will 
be a testing ground for the prestige of EU and its position as a global player. 
 
Partition of Kosovo can not be proposed or accepted by Kosovar politicians, only in 
the context of exchanging Mitrovica and Albanian inhabited Presevo Valley. 
However this will not be possible due to the fact that maintenance of multiethnic 
structure in the Balkans, and exchange of territory and population are against a 
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principal EU objective. There might be some EU member states which individually 
support partition as a solution, despite the fact that in the end they will act in 
accordance with Common Foreign and Security Policy. In addition, the loss of 
Presevo valley where the transportation routes are crucial for the connection of Serbia 
with Mediterranean will neither outweigh the loss of a considerable portion of Kosovo 
and Serbian desires to have compensation, and nor the mineral rich places around 
Mitrovica is a panacea for the Serbian economy.  
 
Albanians are of key importance for USA interests in the Balkans because of their 
strategic position and pro-USA stances, as a consequence it is expected that as long as 
Russians play the Serb card to increase their influence, USA will play Albanians. 
Moreover, the loss of Kosovo may trigger anti-Western sentiments in Serbia, and 
reinforcement on the Russian-Serbian alliance. In spite of this possibility, a total turn 
to the Milosevic mentality in the sense of an armed struggle with Kosovo, and NATO 
forces, will not occur; there will be nationalist rhetoric, small scale assaults among 
Albanians and Serbs, and a degree of souring relations with West. The most 
significant threat that Serbia make has an economic nature, as Kosovo’s electricity 
supply comes from Serbia; Serbia may cut off it in order to destroy Kosovo’s 
economic development. Although this option is desirable for Serbia on short term 
horizons, this is not favorable for medium and long term horizons either. Since, it is 
evident that an economic blockade may provoke USA and EU to take some measures 
against Serbia.  
   
The negative effects of Kosovo’s independence will be felt greatly in Macedonia, and 
Bosnia depending directly on Serbian and Albanian’s attitude in the area. Serbia’s 
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role in instigation of secessionist claims of Republica Srpska will accelerate the 
course of Bosnia’s fragmentation. Simultaneously, the pockets of Albanians in 
Macedonia and Serbia may resort to violence to unite with independent Kosovo, 
given their discontent with the economic inequalities, and the continuation of second 
class citizenship in the above mentioned states. Hence, Macedonia and Serbia must be 
careful and work on the improvement of Albanian minorities’ status. Also, Serbia 
must be cautious while provoking secessionist claims of Republica Srspka, as Serbia’s 
territorial integrity is at stake due to the forthcoming Albanian uprising in Presevo 
valley. Thus, the visions of greater Kosovo and /or Greater Serbia which flourish on 
an unbalanced atmosphere, and can cause further disintegration in the region and are 
dangerous for the security, prosperity and stability. 
 
Russian EU relations may sour temporarily because of EU position in Kosovo issue. 
On the other hand, relations will strike a balance in medium terms; as Russia and EU 
had common benefits in diverse subjects, which energy is the main one. Russia will 
more likely to perceive Kosovo question as a bargaining tool with USA, so that it 
could obtain concessions from USA , particularly its privileged position concerning 
CIS. However, Russia should be aware of the fact that recognition of Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, and Transdienster may backfire, because there are separatist movements 
inside Russia, mostly Chechnya, so this may cause trouble for Russia’s territorial 
integrity. Besides, China has separatist movements too concerning Tibet, Xingjian, so 
there will be problems between Russia and China. China’s position on Kosovo’s 
independence will be linked to two factors; which are not provoking anger of USA 
and Russia’s approval of Kosovo’s final status as independence.  
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